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Fairness and Unfairness in Television Product Advertising
In a dramatic shift in policy, 1 the Federal Trade Commission has
proposed strict new regulation of children's television advertising.
On February 28, 1978, the Commission unanimously approved staff
recommendations to initiate a trade regulation rule that would ban
all televised advertising directed at preschool-age children, ban televised advertising directed at children aged up to eleven years of sugared foods , posing high dental-health risks, and require that
commercials viewed by these older children for other sugared foods
be balanced by nutrition and health messages financed by advertisers.2 Hearings on these proposals are expected to be lengthy, and the
affected industries are mobilizing qpposition. 3
Whatever the fate of the FTC initiatives, they have brought into
sharp focus fundamental questions about the social role of television
advertising, the need and authority for governmental regulation, and
the limits to such regulation imposed by the first amendment. The
FTC has singled out for attention an especially vulnerable and sympathetic class-children. But the powerful messages of television advertising reach virtually all Americans. Decisions about the
regulation of children's television advertising will necessarily implicate larger issues of public policy and constitutional rights.
The purpose of television product advertisements4 is to induce a
1. The recent history of the Federal Trade Commission's -response to children's television
advertising practices is set forth in note 168 iefra.
2. In its notice of rulemaking, the Commission invited comment on whether it should:
(a) Ban all televised advertising for any product which is directed to, or seen by,
audiences composed of a significant proportion of children who are too young to understand the sellirig purpose of or otherwise comprehend or evaluate the advertising;
(b) Ban tefevisea advertising for su~ared food products directed to, or seen 1:iy, audiences composed of a significant proport10n of older children, the consumption of which
products poses the most serious aental health risks;
(c) Require televised advertising for sugared food products not included in Paragraph (b), whlch is directed to, or seen by, audiences composed of a significant proportion
of older children, to be balanced by nutritional and/or liealth disclosures funded by advertisers.
.
FTC Proposed Trade Regulation Rulemaking and Public Hearing, 43 Fed. Reg. 17967, 17969
(1978). The rulemaking notice indicated that ''young children" referred to those below the age
of eight and "older children" referred to those aged eight to eleven. Id. at 17969 nn. 16 & 17.
3. Schorr, Some TV Ads That May Mislead Children Face Ban FrC Staff Plans To
Recommend, Wall St. J., Feb. 24, 1978, at 10, col. 3.
4. This Note is primarily concerned with product advertising and thus does not contemplate issues involving conventional political advertising or corporate "image" advertising. To
the extent the latter two forms of advertising contribute to political debate, the first amendment affords them broad protection from regulation. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964). To the extent that corporate "image" advertising affects commercial transactions, it may be subject to regulation by the Federal Trade Commission. See letter from the
Federal Trade Commission to Senator Thomas McIntyre and several other members of Congress (Apr. 30, 1975), reprinted in 5 TRADE REo. REP. (CCH) ~ 50,231 (1975); address by then•
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purchase. But, in thirty seconds of sight and sound, each commercial
conveys countless messages extending far beyond the product to the
mores, values, and aspirations of our society. Their aggregate impact
upon viewer attitudes is difficult to ascertain, but accumulating evidence suggests that the impact may be substantial. Some advertisements may color citizens' perceptions of important, controversial
issues. Some may perpetuate and reinforce psychologically destructive cultural stereotypes. Some may mislead, affirmatively or tacitly,
on vital purchasing decisions. Advertising accounts for a significant
portion of television broadcasting time, and television occupies an
increasingly significant portion of Americans' lives. For a nation
committed to "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" political debate,5 to cultural pluralism, and to the health and welfare of its people, the impact of television product advertising raises troubling
questions.
The first section of this Note explores the impact of television
product advertising6 on viewer attitudes. The next two sections set
forth the statutory basis on which the Federal Communications
Commission and the Federal Trade Commission could provide for
the effective presentation of contrasting points of view on controversial issues implicitly or explicitly raised by television product advertising, could ensure that the implicit messages of such advertisements
are delivered fairly and without deception, and could counter the
adverse effects of such advertising. The purpose of these sections is
not to predict actual regulatory behavior, for in fact the FCC and
FTC have shown a reluctance to take any action in these areas. The
final section considers the constitutional limits on any governmental
response to television advertising in light of the Supreme Court's
traditional differentiation between broadcasting and the print media
and of the Court's recent abandonment of the doctrine that commercial speech enjoys no first amendment protection.
I.

THE MESSAGES OF TELEVISION ADVERTISING

In the span of three decades, television has emerged as a dominant cultural institution in the United States. The parade of statistics, though familiar, still astonishes. Ninety-seven per cent of all
American households have a television set and forty-three per cent
FTC Chairman Lewis A. Engman to the Antitrust Section of the State Bar of Michigan (Feb.
15, 1974), reprinted in 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ~ 50,200 (1974); Ludlam, Abatement of
Corporate Image Environmental Advertising, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 247 (1974). The Federal Communication Commission's "fairness doctrine" covers both forms of advertising if they expressly address controversial issues. See text at note 71 infra.
5. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
6. See note 4 S11pra for a discussion of the scope of this term.
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have two or more.7 The average set is on more than six hours each
day, with usage increasing to nearly eight hours if a preschool-age
child is in the home. Today's eighteen-year-old has spent approximately 22,000 hours in front of a television-more time than in any
other activity except sleeping-and has watched approximately
350,000 commercials along with other programming. 8 In 1976, advertisers spent 6.6 billion dollars on television advertising, 9 which
occupies a significant portion of all broadcast time. 10
The impact of television, and in particular of television product
advertising, on American society is much more difficult to measure
than is the pervasiveness of television viewing. 11 It has proved easier
to design and implement communications strategies than to gauge
their actual effects upon viewer desires, attitudes, and prejudices. Social scientists have struggled to keep pace with rapidly evolving media technologies and techniques, but they have found that the more
they learn, the more they need to leam. 12 The bulk of advertising
research, moreover, is confined to analysis of the sales efficacy of
particular advertising campaigns and provides little information
about the actual impact of television advertising.1 3 Given the com7. Ricklefs, The Television Era: Three Families Show How Generation of T. V. Has Altered
L!festyles, Wall St. J., Oct. 12, 1976, at 1, col. 1.
8. On the average, a student graduating from high school has spent 11,000 hours in the
classroom, which is only approximately half of the time he has spent watching television, Lublin, The Television Era: From Bugs to Batman, Children's TV Shows Produce Adult Anxiety,
Wall St. J., Oct. 19, 1976, at 1, col. 1.
9. See Lancaster, The Television Era: How TV Commercials Use Ploys and Anxiety To Try
To Win Viewers, Wall St.. J., Nov. 1, 1976, at 1, col. 1 (figures are 1976 projections). The
Television Bureau of Advertising has announced a 1980 sales goal of nine billion dollars,
Advertising Age, Jan. 31, 1977, at 8.
10. Many broadcast outlets subscribe to the Television Code of the National Association of
Broadcasters. This code limits the broadcast of ''non-program material" by network-affiliated
stations to 16 minutes per hour. The limit is 9 1/2 minutes per hour for children's programs
aired in "prime time" or on a weekend day; it is 12 minutes for children's programs broadcast
on weekdays outside prime time. NATIONAL ASSN. OF BROADCASTERS, THE TELEVISION CooE
16-17 (19th ed. 1976). "Non-program" material may be of a nonadvertising nature,
11. See Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1100-01 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
842 (1969); Kottman, Truth and the Image ofAdvertising, J. MARKETING, Oct. 1969, at 64.
12. See, e.g., Sheikh, Prasad & Rao, Children's TV Commercials: A Review ofResearch, J.
CoM., Autumn, 1974, at 126.
13. See, e.g., J. KLAPPER, THE EFFECTS OF MAss COMMUNICATION x-xi (1960). In making
public pronouncements, the advertising and broadcasting firms that have sponsored such re•
search face an awkward dilemma: to attract clients, they must claim vast persuasive powers; to
mollify critics, they must disclaim any profound impact. See Foxall, Advertising and the Critics:
1¥lro Is Misleading 1¥lrom!, 48 ADVERTISING Q. 5 (1976), Advertisers must believe that television advertising effectively promotes their products. Thirty seconds of prime-time advertising
sold for an average of $50,000 to $55,000 in the fall of 1977. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1978,
National Economic Survey, at 57. But, when confronted with the criticism that massive adver•
tising of over-the-counter drugs may contribute to a "drug mentality" among younger viewers,
the National Broadcasting Company published studies purporting to demonstrate that " 'teenagers who are exposed to more TV drug advertising are less likely to use illicit drugs.' "
BROADCASTING, June 7, 1976, at 31 (quoting William S. Rubens, an NBC vice president)
(emphasis original).
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plexity of the communication process, one must not mistake ubiquity
for infl.uence. I 4
Despite the need for caution in assessing this impact, authorities
agree that the mass media are adept at reinforcing or channeling
preexistent beliefs of the audience but relatively ineffective in converting the audience to new ones. Is The conclusion does not follow,
however, that television advertising has a negligible impact upon
viewers' values and perceptions. I 6 First, in a changing society the
conservative reinforcement of traditional myths, stereotypes, and
prejudices does have an impact. The least common denominator of
social consensus, embraced by advertisers in order to maximize appeal and minimize offense, is not value-neutral simply because it is
broadly tolerated. I 7
Second, studies indicate that the mass media, though having only
limited ability to alter viewer perceptions radically, may successfully
bring about small, incremental changes in attitude. Is These minor
changes are most likely to occur when the viewer entertains two conflicting opinions or attitudes-in that circumstance, the media may
effectively guide the choice between them. I 9 Because the public is
frequently ambivalent about many complex social questions, conl 4. See Jaffe, The Editorial Responsibility of the Broadcaster: Reflections on Fairness and
Access, 85 HARV. L. REV. 768, 769 (1972); Lazarsfeld & Merton, Mass Communication, Popular Taste and Original Social Action, in MASS COMMUNICATIONS 492, 494 (W. Schramm ed.
1960).
15. See, e.g., J. KLAPPER, supra note 13, at 15-17; P. SANDMAN, D. RUBIN & D.
SACHSMAN, MEDIA 15 (2d ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as P. SANDMAN).
16. See Jaffe, supra note 14, at 769-70.
17. See Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642, 661 (D.C.
Cir. 1971), revd on other grounds sub nom. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic
Natl. Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973); J. KLAPPER, supra note 13, at 38; H. SCHILLER, MAss COMMUNICATIONS AND AMERICAN EMPIRE 149 (1969); Lazarsfeld & Merton, supra note 14, at 50304. "In America, where commercial control [of media] sanctions only the sanctioned, rebels are
particularly unlikely to receive much aid from mass media. The essential danger of mass media in America lies in their ability to inflate existing consent to the point of a dull unanimity,
and so to achieve social and economic stasis." Klapper, Mass Media and the Engineering of
Consent, 17 AM. SCHOLAR 419, 428 (1948).
Recent evolution of Coca-Cola advertising provides an intriguing example of the interplay of television advertising and political and cultural attitudes. According to Advertising Age,
the company's policy is to tailor its advertising campaign to "the mood of the country." In
1974, to complement its long-running "It's the real thing" campaign, Coke introduced its
"Look up, America" theme "to accentuate the positive, to provide some relief from Watergate
problems and the 'down' side of life." The company then discarded both themes in favor of
"Coke for better times,'' which was accompanied by faster, march-tempo music described as
reminiscent of "When the Saints Go Marching In." Advertising Age, April 26, 1976, at I.
Whether Coca-Cola's advertising was effective in distracting the nation from the trauma of
Watergate is debatable, but it is significant that the company intended both to sell a product
and to brighten the national self-image. q. D. POTTER, PEOPLE OF PLENTY 188 (1954) (advertising is intended not only to sell the product, but also to shape human standards).
18. J. KLAPPER, supra note 13, at 17-18.
19. See id at 44-45.

502

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 76:498

stant exposure through television to a particular idea or attitude may
significantly shape some viewer perceptions.
Finally and most critically, it appears doubtful that people's
resistance to attitudinal conversion extends beyond the explicit commercial message of an advertisement to its implicit cultural
messages, which Margaret Mead has called "the ad behind the ad." 20
These supplementary, incidental messages may circumvent the conscious defenses of the viewer and more readily influence his attitude. 21 An advertisement might not convince viewers to buy a
particular brand of cigars, but it might reassure them that a woman's
primary role is sexual omamentation.22 A snack food advertisement
need not induce a purchase to suggest to the viewer that processed
snack foods are nutritious. 23 Although generally ancillary to advertising's commercial purpose,24 these messages touch upon every aspect of American life. Their role in shaping attitudes and opinions
regarding three issues-the environment, sexism, and nutrition-may be representative.
The cultural environment modifies people's perceptions of their
physical environment.25 Perception of environmental concerns as
"problems:' in tum, is a prerequisite to attention and action.26 Where
advertising promotes products that harm the environment or endorses values that contribute to environmentally destructive practices, it may have an impact upon public attitudes on important
20. Mead, Some Cultural Approaches to Communications Problems, in MASS CoMMUNICA•
TIONS 329, 340 (W. Schramm ed. 1960).
21. Id. at 339-40. See Adorno, How To Loo/cat Television, 8 Q. FILM, RADIO, & T.V. 213,
221 (1954); Gussow, Countemutritional Messages ofTVAds Aimed at Cllildren, 4 J. NUTRITION
EDUC. 48, 50 (1972); Reed, The Psychological Impact of TV Advertising and the Needfor FTC
Regulation, 13 AM. Bus. L.J. 171, 179 (1975).
22. For example, in one Muriel cigar television commercial (outline on file at Mic/iigan
Law Review), workmen are shown doing their jobs. Suddenly, lights illuminate the rear of the
scene. A blonde woman in a cutaway, string-skirted gown dances across the stage and hands
cigars to the men. She then sings:
Turn off the bright lights and turn off the gloom. Great-tasting Muriel will light up the
room. Light up a Muriel and light up your life. Let in the sunshine wherever you are.
Reach for a Muriel, it's one great cigar. Light up a Muriel and light up your life.
23. In one television advertisement, the announcer stated:
" Like new Hostess Twinkies that golden sponge cake • • • with creamy filling • • •
now gives your children more than good taste. It gives them important nutrition, too.
Because now Hostess Twinkies are fortified with body-building vitamins and iron to grow
on. . . . Now there are snack cakes with more than good taste. New vitamin-fortified
Hostess snack cakes. . . . Thank Hostess for the good taste kids love, and good nutrition
they need."
ITT Continental Baking Co., 83 F.T.C. 865, 982, modffeed, 83 F.T.C. 1105 (1973), eeforcemenl
order as modified granted, 532 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1976) (quoting snack cake advertisement).
24. Seenote 50 i'!fra.
25. W. BURCH, H. CHEEK & L. TAYLOR, SOCIAL BEHAVIOR, NATIONAL RESOURCES, AND
THE ENVIRONMENT 201 (1972).
26. Murch, Who Cares About the Environmenll, in ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERN ll-12
(MSS Information Corp. 1974).
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environmental issues. 27 First, consumers' purchasing decisions affect
the health of ecosystems. 28 Moreover, as noted above, product advertisements may affect attitudes without successfully inducing
purchase.29 Thus, a viewer might decide not to buy a snowmobile
but learn from advertising that snowmobiling is an enjoyable, socially approved recreation.30 The broadcast of advertisements for soft
drinks in disposable containers when a bill banning no-return bottles
is pending in a state legislature, for home trash compactors when
recycling is being urged as a means of solid waste management, or
for automobiles when a bond issue for public transportation or
bikeways is before the voters may influence the viewer both as a
consumer and as a citizen. More generally, the "consumption ethic"
promoted by television advertising31 may simply overwhelm the
"land ethic" of respect for the natural environment. 32 Where advertising panders an illusion of abundance, where it manifests resources
~mly as consumer goods, where it glorifies technology as a panacea
for shortages worldly and spiritual, advertising intervenes in environmental controversy.33 The endorsement of energy-intensive,
high-mobility, throwaway lifestyles in suburban settings is a significant social statement with major ramifications for land use, air pollution, and energy conservation.
The stereotyping of women in television product advertising has
received extensive documentation. 34 A summary of several indepen27. Empirical evidence of the impact of product advertising on environmental attitudes is
negligible. See text at notes 11-13 supra. One limited study of the impact of an advertising
campaign claiming antipollution benefits of a brand of gasoline reached inconclusive results.
Sandman, Madison Avenue v. the Environmentalists, 5 J. ENVTL. EDUC. 45, 49 (1973).
28. See generally P. EHRLICH & A. EHRLICH, POPULATION, RESOURCES, AND ENVIRONMENT 196 (2d ed. 1972); A. FRITCHE, THE CONTRASUMERS (1974); P. SWATEK, THE
USER'S GUIDE TO THE PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT (1970).
29. See text at notes 20-21 supra.
30. See, e.g., WMTW Television (Poland Spring, Maine), Snowmobile Advertiser Texts
(copy for several snowmobile advertisements) (on file at Michigan Law Review office). In one
advertisement, snowmobiles are shown roaring across snow-covered slopes as a voice sings:
Hey Blue .•. Big Blue . . . it's a real mobile with a real good feel . . . it's a Sno Jet, you
bet . • • Big Blue . . gotta get goin' while the snow is snowin' . . we'll be riding high . .
we're goin' to pass them by. We'll take 'em on a hill like they're standing still . . . Big
Blue. Star Jet, SST, Whisper Jet .. they're the Big Blue Sno Jet snowmobiles for 73. And
with features like the multiplex 2 slide suspension and positrack for fantastic hill climbing. You don't have to look any further for a snowmobile. (Music) Hey Blue .. ridin'
Blue • . gonna have some fun with a son of a gu.n . . • gonna move on out make the other
ones run. Be it black or green or yellow . . . it's mean . . • Big Blue. Hey Blue . . . Big
Blue •.. It's a real mobile with a real good feel . . . it's a Sno Jet . . . you bet. Big Blue.
31. See note 50 infra.
32. See A. LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC WITH EsSAYS ON CONSERVATION
ROUND RIVER 236 (1966).
33. See also Gussow, Consuming in the Year 2000, 76 Tchrs. C. Rec. (Colum. U.) 665
(1975); White, The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis, in THE SUBVERSIVE SCIENCE 34
(P. Shepard & D. McKinley eds. 1969).
34. See, e.g., Busby, Sex-Role Research on the Mass Media, J. CoM., Autumn, 1975, at 107;
Courtney & Whipple, Women in TV Commercials, J. CoM. Spring, 1974, at 110; Hennessee &
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dent surveys contrasts the portrayal of men and women in television
advertising:
The world for women in the ads is a domestic one, where women are
housewives who worry about cleanliness and food preparation and
serve their husbands and children. Seldom is a woman shown combining out-of-home employment with management of her home and personal life.
The picture of men is quite different. Men are portrayed as the
voices of authority. They are ten times more likely to be used as the
voice-over. . . . Men are shown in a wide range of occupations and
roles in both their out-of-home working and leisure lives. Inside the
home, they are more often portrayed as beneficiaries of women's work
than as contributors to household duties.35

More concisely and more bluntly, two commentators have concluded
that women in television advertising "play two stock roles-the
housewife-mother or the sex object. In both, they are viewed solely
in their relation to men."36 Although it is difficult to ascertain the
precise impact that conservative role models in television advertising
have in perpetuating these stereotypes,37 surely such stereotyping
does have psychological, social, and political effects. Women who
have their own careers and interests may feel guilt and depression, 38
and women generally may refrain from entering professions and
from engaging in other assertive behavior. The policy decisions of
persons in positions of power may reflect the stereotyping, and portrayals of women content with very circumscribed domestic roles
may suggest little need for remedial equal-rights legislation. Finally,
men may be encouraged to treat women as sexual and domestic adjuncts and may feel obligated to act dominantly and aggressively. In
sum, television advertising endorses and helps effectuate a potentially destructive view of social relations. 39
Nicholson, NOW Says: TV Commercials Insult Women, N.Y. Times, May 28, 1972, § 6 (Magazine), at 12; Silverstein & Silverstein, Tire Portrayal of Women in Television Advertising, 27
FED. CoM. B.J. 71 (1974); Note, Ring Around the Collar-Chain Around Her Neck: A Proposal
To Monitor Sex Role Stereotyping in Television Advertising, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 149, 149-51
(1976).
35. Courtney & Whipple, supra note 34, at 116-17. The surveys found that 75% of all
television advertisements using women are for kitchen and bathroom products. Seventy-eight
percent of the women are portrayed in a home or family setting, compared to 5% of the men.
Of the voice-overs (announcers' voices), 87-89% are male. Id. at 111, 113, 115,
36. Hennessee & Nicholson, supra note 34, at 12. See, e.g., the advertisement discussed in
note 22 supra.
37. People tend to emulate models portrayed on television. Busby, supra note 34, at 107,
125-26; Siegel, Communicating with the Next Genera/ion, J. CoM., Autumn, 1975, at 14, 23. See
Note, supra note 34, at 152-53.
38. See generally P. CHESLER, WOMEN AND MADNESS (1972).
39. See generally s. DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX (1953); M. FASTEAU, THE MALE
MACHINE (1974); B. FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (1963).
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Nutrition is a third area affected by television advertising. The
twentieth century has witnessed a radical change in the American
diet. Foods rich in fat and sugar have replaced the complex carbohydrates-fruit, vegetables, and grains-as staples. Because fats and
sugars are low in vitamins and minerals, over-consumption and malnutrition simultaneously pose serious health problems.40 Nutritionists and consumer organizations have increasingly focused their
concern about this problem on the role of food industry advertising,
which amounted to twenty-eight per cent of all television advertisement spending in 1975.41
Numerous studies have shown that much television advertising
promotes heavily processed foods rich in fats and sugars42 and affects the nutritional concepts of viewers,43 especially children.44 As
40. See STAFF OF THE SELECT COMMITIEE ON NUTRITION AND HUMAN NEEDS, UNITED
STATES SENATE, DIETARY GOALS FOR THE UNITED STATES 1 (1977) [hereinafter cited as DIETARY GoALS]. Fats and sugars now account for at least 60% of caloric intake, an increase of
20% since the early 1900s. Id. at 9. Although dietary quality and income level roughly correlate, high income does not insure good nutrition. A 1965 report found that 9% of all households with greater than $10,000 income had poor diets. AGRICULTURAL REsEARCH SERVICE,
U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, DIETARY LEVELS OF HOUSEHOLDS IN THE UNITED STATES 5
(1965), cited in Federal Trade Commission, Staff Statement of Fact, Law, and Policy in Support of the Proposed Rule and in Support of Affirmative Disclosures in Food Advertising, 39
Fed. Reg. 39,852, 39,853 (1974) [hereinafter cited as FTC Staff Statement].
41. DIETARY GOALS, supra note 40, at 59. In 1975, food advertisers spent $1.15 billion for
television time. Id.
42. See, e.g., id. at 59; Choate, The Sugar-Coated Children's Hour, 214 THE NATION 146
(1972); Goodman, A Limit on Ads far Kids, Wash. Post, Sept. 15, 1976, § A, at 21, col. 5;
Gussow, supra note 21, at 50; Lublin, supra note 8, at 37, col. 2.
A 1975 study of four Chicago television stations found that 70% of weekday advertising
promoted foods high in fat, saturated fat, cholesterol, sugar, or salt. On weekends the figure
reached 85%. Only 3% of weekday and 1.7 % of weekend food advertising were devoted to
fruits and vegetables. No advertising promoted fresh vegetables. DIETARY GOALS, supra note
40, at 59-63. In a one-week test period, one survey found that over 80% of all advertising on
children's programs was for ingestibles. Gussow, supra note 21, at 49. Ninety percent of these
ads highlighted the products' sugared, sweetened, or fried ("crisped") properties.Choate, supra
at 146.
43. See, e.g., the advertisment noted in note 23 supra.
44. See, e.g., D. YANKELOVICH, INC., EFFECTS OF NUTRITION LABELING ON FOOD
PURCHASING (1970) (cited in FTC Staff Statement, supra note 40, at 39,857 n.80); Advertising
Age, Dec. 20, 1976, at 43; Wash. Star, Nov. 20, 1976, § C, at 1; Atkin, Children's Nutrition
Learning from Television Food Advertising (unpaginated manuscript of article to appear in
Journal of Nutn~ion Research during 1977).
In the absence of authoritative information to the contrary, consumers believe that
heavily advertised name-brand foods are good products and universally high in nutrition. D.
YANKELOVICH, INC., supra (as cited in FTC Staff Statement, supra note 40, at 39,857). Children who watch a great deal of Saturday morning television are more likely than others to
believe that sweets are "good for you," and they are more likely to consume the foods advertised. Moreover, this effect generalizes to unadvertised brands of the same product categories:
dry cereals, candy bars, snacks, desserts, and soft drinks. Atkin, supra.
Nutritionist Joan Gussow notes that "it is an article of faith among nutritionists that the
reason we have so much trouble altering people's diets for the better is because eating habits,
once established, are hard to change. Yet, somehow, between 1928 and 1968, people had
learned to eat thousands of new food items." Gussow, supra note 21, at 48. Dr. Gussow places
much of the responsibility on advertising. Id. at 52.
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food prices rise, ill-informed purchases increase the financial burden
on the consumer, especially the low-income consumer.45 Television
food advertising, potentially an effective tool for nutrition and education,46 instead educates viewers to eat nutritionally deficient foods.
The impact of television product advertising in these three areas
of public concern suggests the scope and pervasiveness of its societal
impact.47 As the authority of traditional institutions such as church
and family has declined, the mass media have played an increasing
role in transmitting cultural norms and creating consensus.4-8 However, as historian David Potter observed, television advertising, unlike more traditional institutions, lacks social responsibility: "[It] has
45. See FfC Staff Statement, supra note 40, at 39,854; WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON
FOOD, NUTRITION, AND HEALTH, FINAL REPORT 59 (1970) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT].
To the extent that these purchases are ·financed through federal programs, there exists a
government subsidy of unnutritious food manufacturing. See K. CLARKSON, FooD STAMPS
AND NUTRITION 1, 56, 62, 76-77 (1975).
46. Since World War Il, food advertising has represented the largest expenditure for public dietary education in the United States. DIETARY GOALS, supra note 40, at 59. The Panel on
Popular Education and How To Reach Disadvantaged Groups, of the White House Confer•
ence on Food, Nutrition, and Health, noted the extraordinary influence of television and suggested that ''the gaps in our public knowledge about nutrition, along with actual
misinformation carried by some media, are contributing seriously to the problem of hunger
and malnutrition in the United States." FINAL REPoRT, supra note 45, at 179-80. The Panel's
reco=endations are set forth in note 194 i'!fra.
47. Empirical evidence of this impact, though persuasive, is not conclusive. As the
Supreme Court has recognized, however, countless regulations of co=ercial activity are
predicated upon the "unprovable assumptions" that constitute social consensus. Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 61-62 (1973). Cf. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 6 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976) ("Man's ability to alter his environment has developed
far more rapidly than his ability to foresee with certainty the effects of his alterations. . . •
[W]atchdog agencies . . . must deal with predictions and uncertainty, with developing evidence, and, sometimes, with little or no evidence at all."); Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514
F.2d 492, 520 (8th Cir. 1975) (''the level of probability does not readily convert into a prediction of consequences . . . . The best that can be said is that the existence of this asbestos
contaminant in air and water . . . creates some health risk. Such a contaminant should be
removed").
Psychologist John Condry, noting the comparison between unforeseen ecological and
social effects, has suggested:
Since the pace of change is likely to remain quite high, our survival as a society is in
· large measure dependent upon our ability to forecast the effects of technological and related social change, and to reverse a dangerous trend once the dangers become apparent.
We shall have to be more responsive to tlie way a variety of forces m society interact, and
more willing to slow the pace of change until we are relatively sure that society can survive the shock of a given innovation.
J. Condry, Childhood, Technology, and Society 7 (mimeograph copy of co=ents before the
FfC Hearings on Television and Children, Nov. 8, 1971, on file at the Michigan Law Review).
48. See Wirth, Consensus and Mass Communication, in MAss COMMUNICATIONS 561, 57475 (W. Schra= ed. 1960); J. Condry, supra note 47, at 3-6.
Historian Daniel Boorstin has concluded that television advertising has supplanted local and regional songs and stories as the new folk culture of modem America. D. BooRSTIN,
DEMOCRACY AND ITS DISCONTENTS 38-42 (1971). Empirical evidence tends to support this
theory. A majority of mothers surveyed in the Los Angeles area reported that their children
were singing television advertising jingles by age two; by age three, over 90% had joined the
chorus. Almost 90% of all three-year-olds personally interviewed could identify Fred Flint•
stone from a photograph. Siegel, supra note 37, at 22.
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in its dynamics no motivation to seek the improvement of the individual or to impart qualities of social usefulness." 49 Instead, this advertising reflects a distorted image of reality that affirms only those
values coincident with its commercial purpose. so
At a time of increasing demands that business be accountable to
the larger society for its actions, the question arises whether the selfinterested voice of television advertising should be permitted to continue largely unrestrained and unrebutted. If some governmental response is appropriate, it must be based upon a concern for the public
health and welfare and for the presentation of free, pluralistic discourse. The statutory authority for and the constitutional limits to
such a response require careful examination.
49. D. POITER, supra note 17, at 177.
50. Potter identified advertising, along with churches, schools, and businesses, as "an institution of social control," that is, an institution that "guide[s] the life of the individual by conceiving of him in a distinctive way and encouraging him to conform as far as possible to the
concept." D. POITER, supra note 17, at 176. Potter did not object to the existence or influence
of these institutions, as he recognized that they inhere in human culture. But Potter was troubled by the "lack of institutional responsibility" he thought unique to advertising:
[T]hough it wields an immense social influence, comparable to the influence of religion
and learning, it has no social goals and no social responsibility for what it does with its
influence, so long as it refrains from palpable violations of truth and decency. . . . Occasional deceptions, breaches of taste, and deviations from sound ethical conduct are in a
sense superficial and are not necessarily intrinsic. . . . What is basic is that advertising, as
such . . . ultimately regards man as a consumer and defines its own mission as one of
stimulating him to consume or to desire to consume.
Id. at 177. See also Mead, supra note 20, at 339-43.
A recent exchange of leters in Advertising Age illustrates the principle of nonresponsibility.
In one letter, an executive noted a print advertisement for an automobile theft alarm. The
advertisement featured a smiling woman with beckoning eyes and in a low-cut dress. The copy
read "Don't say no to a Pro! . . . A pro that is used to working on the street!" Letter from
Robert B. Martin, Advertising Age, Dec. 6, 1976, at 48 (quoting advertisement). The advertising executive responsible for the ad stated in a subsequent letter: "If the client likes the ad, if it
reaches the target audience and induces t!J.em to buy, if awareness of the product increases,
hiking sales, have we not fulfilled our role? I think we have." Letter from T.L. Thome, Advertising Age, Dec. 20, 1976, at 44.
In some cases, however, these underlying messages are not totally unrelated to the commercial purposes of advertising. For example, reinforcing stereotyped sex roles for women may be
essential to the sales of some cosmetics or household products, and consumer attitudes towards
environmental degradation are probably closely linked to the sales strategies for particular
types of automobiles and recreational vehicles.
The most common message of product advertising, then, is materialism. To induce consumption, the advertisement must persuade viewers that the acquisition of material goods will
satisfy their wants. Thus, in the fictive world of the television commercial, people's lives are
defined by the goods they consume and by the approval of others. In surveying hundreds of
television commercial scripts reviewed by the Federal Trade Commission, then-Commissioner
Mary Gardiner Jones found that they espoused two controlling principles: materialism-the
satisfaction of inner needs by the acquisition or use of things-and external motivation-personal satisfaction derived from without rather than developed within, such as emulating neighbors. Jones, The Cultural and Social Impact ofAdvertising on American Society,
1970 L. & Soc. ORD. 379, 381-84. See also D. RIESMAN, THE LONELY CROWD 97 (1950); H.
SKORNIA, TELEVISION AND SOCIETY 158 (1965).
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THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE

Congress has empowered the-Federal Communications Commission to regulate broadcasting "as public convenience, interest, or necessity requires." 51 In the discharge of this broad mandate, the FCC
has required that licensees devote a reasonable portion of broadcast
time to provide fair coverage of opposing views on controversial issues. Where one side of a controversial public issue is raised, the
broadcaster is under a fairness obligation to provide opportunities
for the presentation of contrasting views. 52 If necessary, the licensee
must provide the reply programming at its own expense. 53 These
principles comprise the fairness doctrine. It is under this doctrine
that those discontented with the cultural and political content of television advertising have typically brought their grievances.
Given television's historical dependence upon advertising for financial support;54 the proposed application of the fairness doctrine
to advertising appears to threaten the industry far more profoundly
than does its application to regular programming. Unlike a conventional fairness ruling, which interferes slightly with the broadcaster's
editorial discretion, application of the fairness doctrine to advertising reaches the hand of the public into the broadcaster's pocketbook. 55
In this context, the 1967 decision of the FCC-an agency generally sensitive to the concerns of licensees56-requiring broadcasters
51. Communications Act of 1934, § 303, 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
52. In re Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949). See Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); In re The Handling of Public Issues Under the
Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act, Fairness
Report, 48 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Fairness Report], petition for reconsideration
denied, 58 F.C.C.2d 691 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Fairness Report Rehearing]; In re Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of Public Importance,
40 F.C.C. 598 (1964); Houser, The Fairness Doctrine-An Historical Perspective, 41 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 550 (1972); Comment, The FCC's Fairness JJoclrine in Opera/ion, 20 BUFFALO L.
REv. 663 (1971).
53. See Cullman Broadcasting Co., 40 F.C.C. 576 (1963).
54. In the early days of radio, government and private enterprise moved somewhat awkwardly by trial and error to resolve the novel problem of devising an effective and appropriate
means of financing a national broadcasting system. By the advent of television that problem
had been resolved. From the outset, advertising lias been an indispensable element of television. H. SCHILLER, supra note 17, at 26.
Until the 1950s quiz show scandals, advertisers themselves prepared most programming. Today, networks finance the production of programming by selling time to advertisers; to remain on the air programming must not only attract and retain a sizeable audience,
but also put the audience in a mood receptive to the advertiser's appeal. See P. SANDMAN,
supra note 15, at 7-8, 135, 139.
55. There is vigorous debate over the potential economic impact upon the industry of application of the fairness doctrine to product advertising. See note 95 infra and accompanying
text. No one denies, however, that the requirement of reply time to advertisements deemed
controversial would to some degree reduce broadcasters' revenues by lessening the value of air
time to advertisers and by replacing some advertisements with unpaid reply broadcasts.
56. Comment, A Proposed Statutory Righi To Respond lo Environmental Advertisements:
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to air antismoking messages to counter conventional cigarette advertisements57 seems an act of extraordinary courage or naivete, or
both. Whatever the explanation for this decision, the Commission
soon realized the potential ramifications of recognizing that television advertisements for arguably hazardous products could give rise
to fairness obligations and thus attempted to limit its ruling to the
"unique situation" of cigarette advertising.58
The "crazy quilt" of FCC decisions that followed as the Commission struggled to find some logical limitation to the principle underlying its cigarette decision has been amply chronicled elsewhere. 59 In
brief, the Commission refused to apply the fairness doctrine to any
pure product advertisement, whether it promoted large automobiles
Access lo the Airways After CBS v. .Democratic National Committee, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 234,
245-46 (1974) (suggesting that the FCC may be a "captured agency").
57. Television Station WCBS-TV, 8 F.C.C.2d 381 (1967), stay and rehearing denied sub
nom. Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine to Cigarette Advertising, 9 F.C.C.2d 921 (1967),
qffd. sub. nom. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842
(1969). The Commission's decision responded to a letter from John F. Banzhaf, III, which
complained that WCBS-TV was presenting only one side of a controversial issue of public
im}Jortance by broadcasting
cigarette advertisements which by their portrayals of youthful or virile-looking or sophisticated persons enjoying cigarettes in interesting and exciting situations deliberately seek
to create the impression ano present the point of view that smoking is socially acceptable
and desirable, manly, and a necessary part of a rich, full life.
405 F.2d at 1086. In a brief letter to WCBS-TV, the Commission stated:
The advertisements in question clearly promote the use of a particular cigarette as attractive and enjoyable. Indeed, they understandably have no other purpose. We believe that a
station which presents such advertisements has the duty of informing its audience of the
other side of t1iis controversial issue of public importance-that, however enjoyable, such
smoking may be a hazard to the smoker's healtli.
8 F.C.C.2d at 382.
As early as 1946, the Commission had acknowledged that product advertising could raise
controversial issues deserving reply under fairness principles. See In re Sam Morris, 11 F.C.C.
197 (1946) (dictum). In addition, see In re Broadcast Licensees Advised Concerning Stations'
Responsibilities Under the Fairness Doctrine as to Controversial Issue Programming, 40
F.C.C. 571, 572 (1963). Until Banzhafs complaint, however, the principle had not been fully
applied to product advertising.
58. Cigarette Advertising, 9 F.C.C.2d 921, 943 (denial of stay and rehearing of 8 F.C.C.
381 (1967)), discussed in note 57 supra. This attempt to limit the applicability of the fairness
doctrine was made in response to numerous petitions for reconsideration of the Commission's
decision. In denying the petitions, the Commission dismissed the contention that its ruling
logically could not be restricted to cigarette advertising. Petitioners argued that because "very
little in society is uncontroversial," the Commission's theory would also apply to advertising
for other products, including "automobiles, food with high cholesterol count, alcoholic beverages, flouride in toothpaste, pesticide residue in food, aspirin, detergents, candy, gum, soft
drinks, girdles, and even common table salt." The Commission, declaring itself unimpressed
by this "parade of horribles," defended its ruling by stressing the widespread governmental
and private findings of the serious health hazard posed by cigarettes. Claiming no knowledge
of any other advertised product warranting response under the fairness doctrine, the Commission stated that "instances of extension of the ruling to other products upon consideration of
future complaints would be rare, if indeed they ever occurred." 9 F.C.C.2d at 942-43.
Congress subsequently prohibited the advertising of cigarettes on television or radio.
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1976).
59. See Simmons, Commercial Advertising and the Fairness .Doctrine-The New F. CC Policy in Perspective, 75 CoLUM. L. REv. 1083, 1089-100 (1975).
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and leaded gasolines that contribute to air pollution,60 water-polluting phosphate detergents, 61 or trash compactors that inhibit resource
recycling. 62 In every case, the Commission either distinguished the
cigarette ruling on its facts or ignored it entirely. 63 The Commission's attempt to limit its ruling in the cigarette case was temporarily
thwarted, however, by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Friends of the Earth v. FCC. 64 In reviewing the
FCC's dismissal of the complaint in the automobile and gasoline advertising case, the court found the circumstances indistinguishable
from those of cigarette advertising and ordered the Commission to
impose the fairness doctrine's reply requirements upon broadcasters
of advertisements for large automobiles and leaded gasoline, 65 Faced
with the option of either implementing the far-reaching principle implicit in the cigarette ruling or repudiating it altogether, the Commission chose the latter.
On July 12, 1974, the Commission released its long-awaited FairFriends of the Earth, 24 F.C.C.2d 743 (1970), revd., 449 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
William H. Rogers, Jr., 30 F.C.C.2d 640 (1971) .
John S. Macinnis, 32 F.C.C.2d 837 (1971).
For example, in Friends of the Earth, 24 F.C.C.2d 743 (1970), discussed in note 60
supra and accompanying text, the Commission reiterated its assertion that cigarettes are a
"unique product" for purposes of the fairness doctrine. The Commission distinguished cigarettes from other products by stating that "the Government is not urging people to stop
now-without any delay-buying or using gasoline-engine automobiles, detergents, or electricity. The benefits and detriments here are of a more complex nature, and do not permit the
simplistic approach taken to cigarettes." Second, the Commission concluded that no one
would propose a ban on all broadcast advertising of automobiles, as Congress had done in the
case of cigarettes. Finally, the Commission proposed that remedial action be directed at the
environmentally offensive products themselves, suggesting that the national experience with
liquor prohibition had shown this direct approach impracticable for cigarettes, but not for
automobiles. 24 F.C.C.2d at 746-47.
64. 449 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
65. The court, in an opinion by Judge McGowan, rejected the Commission's attempt to
distinguish cigarettes as a unique threat to human health:
The distinction is not apparent to us, any more than we supEose it is to the asthmatic
in New York City for whom increasing air pollution is a mortal danger. Neither are we
impressed by the Commission's assertion that, because no governmental agency has yet
urged the complete abandonment of the use of automobiles, the commercials in question
do not touch upon a controversial issue of public importance. Matters of degree arise in
environmental control, as in other areas oflegal regulation. . . . Commercials which continue to insinuate that the human personality finds i;reater fulfillment in the large car with
the quick &etaway do, it seems to us, ventilate a pomt of view which not only has become
controversial but involves an issue of public imJ?ortance. When there is undisputed evidence, as there is here, that the hazards to health tmplicit in air EOllution are enlarged and
aggravated by such products, then the parallel with cigarette aclvertising is exact and the
relevance of Banzhij"inescapable.
449 F.2d at 1169. The court further commented:
It is obvious that the Commission is faced with great difficulties in tracing a coherent
pattern for the accommodation of_product advertising to the fairness doctrine..•. Pendmg, however, a reformulation of its position, we are unable to see how the Commission
can plausibly differentiate the case before us from Banzhefinsofar as the applicability of
the fairness doctrine is concerned.
449 F.2d at 1170.
60.
61.
. 62.
63.
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ness Report, 66 the first major reconsideration and reformulation of
the fairness doctrine since its inception. The Commission first reiterated the first amendment justification for the doctrine but acknowledged the danger of "undue governmental interference in the
processes of broadcast journalism, and the concomitant diminution
of the broadcaster's and the public's legitimate First Amendment interests."67 Turning to the application of the fairness doctrine to advertising, the Commission noted its traditional respect for the central
role of advertising in the broadcast industry6 8 and emphasized that it
"must proceed with caution so as to ensure that the policies and
standards which are formulated in this area will serve the genuine
purposes of the doctrine without undermining the economic base of
the system." 69
Proceeding with its self-admonished caution, the Commission
announced that the fairness doctrine would apply only to those paid
announcements that are "overtly editorial." 70 Thus, a fairness obligation arises when an advertisement "presents a meaningful statement which obviously addresses, and advocates a point of view on, a
controversial issue of public importance," but not "[i]f the ad bears
only a tenuous relationship to [public] debate, or one drawn by unnecessary inference." 71 The licensee need only make a "common
sense judgment" on this difficult question and will be overruled only
if that judgment is unreasonable or in bad faith. 72 Conventional
product advertising, moreover, was declared wholly beyond the
66. Fairness Report, supra note 52.
67. Id at 6.
68. The FCC stated that the Federal Radio Commission (FRC), the predecessor to the
FCC, had "placed advertising in its proper context and perspective" in 1929. Id at 22. Although broadcasters were licensed to serve public interests, the FRC asserted that advertising
constituted an "exception" to this rule "because advertising furnishes the economic support for
the service and thus makes it possible." 3 F.R.C. ANN. REP. 32 (1929), cited in Fairness Report,
supra note 52, at 22. Although the FCC did not attempt similarly to remove advertising wholly
from the operation of its congressionally mandated "public interest" standard, these deferential remarks indicated its policy preferences.
69. Fairness Report, supra note 52, at 22.
70. Id
71. Id at 22-23. An example of an editorial advertisement, the Commission noted, would
be an advertisement urging a constitutional amendment concerning abortion.
72. Id. at 23-24. The broad discretion afforded the broadcaster and the strict wording of
the standard would seem to relieve the broadcaster of fairness response duties in all but the
most extreme cases. To trigger the fairness doctrine, the advertisement must do more than
merely address a controversial issue in a general way; it must advocate a "point of view" and
must do so "obviously." Id at 23. In deciding if the advocacy is "obvious," the licensee need
only exercise "common sense." Id Thus, advocacy that might be "obvious" to the psychologist
or public relations expert but not to one exercising only "common sense" does not trigger
fairness obligations.
The line between.product advertising and editorial or "image" advertising is not always
distinct. See, e.g., Center for Auto Safety, 32 F.C.C.2d 926 (1972). Under this test, it seems
likely that most corporate advertising intended to influence public opinion and political decisionmaking may escape any fairness response.
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reach of the fairness doctrine. 73 Stating that the purpose of the doctrine is "to facilitate 'the development of an informed public opinion,' " 74 the Commission ,concluded that "standard product
commercials, such as the cigarette ads, make no meaningful contribution toward informing the public on any side of any issue."75 Indeed, since product commercials are not informative in this sense,
presentation of opposing views under the fairness doctrine would,
according to the Report, "provide the public with only one side of a
public controversy." 7 6
The Commission's discussion of the very difficult problem of applying the fairness doctrine to product advertising is unsatisfying in
several respects. The Commission's concern over the first amendment rights of broadcasters is misplaced.77 In upholding the doctrine
as applied to regular programming against challenge under the first
amendment, the Supreme Court has declared that, because broadcast licensees are but trustees of the public airwaves, "it is the right
of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which
is paramount." 78 Still, there may be legitimate concern where application of the doctrine interferes with editorial policy by "chilling"
broadcast coverage of controversial subjects because of the threat of
fairness obligations.7 9
73. Fairness Report, supra note 52, at 24-26.
74. Fairness Report, supra note 52, at 24 (emphasis original) (quoting In re Editorializing
by Broadcast Licensees, supra note 52, at 1249).
75. Fairness Report, supra note 52, at 24. The report quoted the assertion in Banzhafthat
cigarette commercials are " 'at best a negligible "part of any exposition of ideas."' " Id. at 25
(quoting Banzhaf, 405 F.2d 1082, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969),
quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
76. Fairness Report, supra note 52, at 25. The Commission rejected a Federal Trade Commission proposal that the public be provided broadcast time to respond to certain product
advertisements. Id. at 26-28. See note 152 infra.
77. This first amendment concern is discussed in the text at note 67 supra. In addition, see
Fairness Report Rehearing, supra note 52, at 708 (dissenting statement of Commissioner
Robinson); Simmons, supra note 59, at 1108-10.
The status of product advertising as constitutionally protected speech is discussed in
Part IV infra.
78. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
The Supreme Court has recognized the first amendment value in avoiding "the risk of
an enlargement of government control over the content of broadcast discussion of public issues." Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Natl. Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 126 (1973).
Although it rejected on this ground a proposed "right of access" scheme to be monitored by
the FCC, the Court did reaffirm the constitutional propriety of the FCC's administration of
fairness doctrine requirements. See412 U.S. at 126-27.
79. This concern was dismissed as "speculative" in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367, 393 (1969). Moreover, the FCC has reported "no credible evidence" of any such
chilling effect on broadcasters' editorial policies. Fairness Report, supra note 52, at 8.
The potential "chilling effect" of a state statute establishing a "fairness doctrine" for
newspapers led the Supreme Court to strike down the statute as an unconstitutional interfer•
ence with the editorial discretion of the-print media. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tomillo,
418 U.S. 241 (1974). The Court in Miami Heraldvirtually ignored the similarities between the
statute involved in that case and the FCC's fairness doctrine as applied to broadcasters and
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Although this concern might normally caution against imposing
fairness obligations, different interests are present in the context of
product advertising. It might well be that broadcasters have no first
amendment interest in product commercials. 80 They sell time to paying customers, subject only to occasional subjective judgments regarding "good taste." 81 The broadcaster provides the medium for
advertising, not the message.
Under this analysis, the first amendment interest at stake, if any,
is the advertiser's. 82 The Supreme Court has recently noted that
commercial speech "may be more durable than other kinds. Since
advertising is the sine qua non of commercial profits, there is little
likelihood of its being chilled by proper regulation and foregone entirely."83 If an advertisement for a controversial product such as cigarettes triggered a fairness reply, the advertiser would not likely
cease advertising.84 However, if the advertisement were controversial
not because of the product itself, but because of other, unrelated content such as sexual stereotyping, the advertiser would have somewhat
less incentive to protect the controversial message. To the extent that
such advertisements are "chilled" merely by the prospect of rebuttal
under the fairness doctrine, the advertiser's position evokes little
sympathy: the first amendment does not protect the speaker from
free and open debate. The more realistic concern is not that advertising will be chilled but rather that the network will decline to run the
offending advertisement, or at least strongly request that it be withdrawn or modified in order to avoid fairness doctrine obligations. 85
found constitutionally valid in Red Lion. It is beyond the scope of this Note to discuss the
constitutionality of the FCC's fairness doctrine, but it is likely that the Court will continue to
distinguish between the first amendment rights of the print media and of broadcasters. See
generally Bollinger, Freedom ofthe Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory ofPartial Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 MrcH. L. REV. l (1976).
80. See Capitol Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 584 (D.D.C. 1971), qffd.
mem. sub nom. Capitol Broadcasting Co. v. Kleindienst, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972) (cigarette advertising).
8 l. See NATIONAL ASSN. OF BROADCASTERS, supra note IO, at 12. Of course, those broadcasters who do not subscribe to the NAB Code are not subject to any of its requirements.
82. See, e.g., Reply Comments of America Petroleum Inst. at IO, Fairness Report, supra
note 52. The Fairness Report did not discuss the first amendment interests of the advertiser.
83. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
771 n.24 (1976).
84. During the period when cigarette advertising was subject to the FCC's fairness doctrine, cigarette advertising time on television did not decline significantly. See Comment, And
Now a Word Against Our Sponsor: Extending the FCC's Fairness JJoctrine to Advertising, 60
CALIF. L. REV. 1416, 1446 (1972). Advertisers might, of course, counteract the fairness doctrine
by shifting some of their advertising expenditures to media not subject to fairness obligations,
thereby reducing broadcasters' revenues.
85. Because of its economic reliance on advertising, the television network is far less likely
to resist an advertisement for a controversial product, the controversial nature of which the
advertiser of course cannot avoid, than to resist controversial advertising content, which the
advertiser can avoid.
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This result might, loosely speaking, be considered a "chill."86 But
a chill is constitutionally impermissible only if the speech withheld is
protected by the first amendment. It would have been inconsistent
for the FCC to allow potential "chilling effects" to preclude application of the fairness doctrine to product commercials, for at the time
of the Fairness Report the Commission apparently did not believe
that product advertising warranted constitutional protection. 87 The
Supreme Court's recent decisions extending some constitutional protection to commercial speech, 88 which have emphasized the public's
interest in receiving product information, 89 might raise concern
about possible chilling of advertiser's speech. However, as this Note
concludes in Part IV, the noninformational content of television advertising does not have first amendment protection. Application of
the fairness doctrine to product advertising seems not to threaten
first amendment interests; rather, by encouraging full discussion of
controversial issues, it would appear to advance the public's first
amendment right to be informed,9°
The fundamental error of the Fairness Report, however, is that it
86. The expression "chilling effect" arose in recognition of the need to protect individuals
from statutes threatening criminal sanctions or loss of employment for vaguely defined restrictions of expression or association. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604
(1967); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965); Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago,
365 U.S. 43, 74 n.11 (1961) (Warren, C.J., dissenting). The FCC has applied the term to the
potential financial disincentive to broadcasters to cover subjects triggering fairness doctrine
obligations. See Fairness Report, supra note 52, at 7. The application of the concept to advertisers' difficulties in their relations with networks and the resulting impact on their marketing
strategy, see Reply Comments of American Petroleum Inst., supra note 82, seems attenuated,
87. See note 75 supra and accompanying text.
88. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U .S. 350 (1977); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), See
generally Part IV infra.
89. See, e.g., Linmark Assocs., Inc. v, Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 8S, 96 (1977),
90. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). To the extent that,
contrary to the FCC's position, the controversial advertising message does enjoy constitutional
protection the chilling of advertisers' speech again becomes cause for concern. This Note suggests that, except for information about the product, television product advertising is not so
protected. See Part IV infra.
Several citizens' organizations have challenged the validity of the Commission's distinctive treatment of product advertising by asserting that the first amendment not only permits
but compels applying the fairness doctrine to product advertising. See Brief for Petitioner
Council on Economic Priorities and Intervenor United Farm Workers at 3-28, Nationnl Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 55S F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1977) [hereinafter cited as
UFW Brief]. The brief argues that, in Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Natl.
Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973), the Supreme Court constitutionnlized the fairness doctrine by
leaving it the sole guardian of viewers' first amendment rights, and that the Court's opinion in
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 42S U.S. 748
(1976), prohibits absolute distinction of commercial from political speech, UFW Brief, supra at
15-23. While the District of Columbia Circuit cited Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc, v. Demo•
cratic Natl. Comm., the court did not consider the fairness doctrine. SSS F.2d at 9S3. q. Note,
The Fairness /Joctrine and Access to Reply to Product Commercials, SI IND. L.J, 7561 766-82
(1976) (discusses the first amendment and commercial speech). But cf. Part IV Infra.
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equates lack of discourse with lack of impact. 91 The FCC contended
that because product commercials make no meaningful contribution
to public debate, the airing of opposing views is purposeless; if commercials do not truly "inform," their broadcast can create no
counteracting duty to inform.92 Yet the Commission's recognition
that television commercial "speech" is unworthy of first amendment
protection93 hardly compels the conclusion that the implicit messages
of product advertising should never give rise to fairness obligations.
On the contrary, speech that does not rise to the level of the first
amendment may nonetheless call for a reasoned response-and perhaps more urgently requires such a response. 94 The FCC's distinction serves to protect the subtle, implicit, nonrational message. The
appeal that plays upon biases and emotions rather than intellect is
rewarded with immunity from rebuttal.
It may be that in actuality the Commission was most concerned
about the economic ramifications for broadcasting should standard
commercials require opportunities for reply, but preferred to rely
primarily on arguments relating to the public interest rather than to
the financial self-interest of the industry. Certainly the hotly contested economic issue is a serious one. 95 However, when confronted
with evidence that questioned the potential economic impact of applying the fairness doctrine to product commercials, the Commission
disclaimed reliance on economic considerations in the adoption of its
new fairness policy. 96 If economic considerations were not determinative of the Commission's decision, then that decision apparently
91. See Note, supra note 34, at 159-60.
92. See Fairness Report, supra note 52, at 24-25.
93. The Fairness Report quoted language from Banzhqfthat treated television commercial
"speech" as unworthy of first amendment protection. Id. at 24-25 (quoting Banzhaf v. FCC,
405 F.2d 1082, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969)). The current status of
product advertising as constitutionally protected speech is discussed in Part IV in.fra.
94. This principle was included in the Banzhefdecision, which approved the imposition of
fairness doctrine requirements upon broadcasters of television advertisements.The Commission's position thus inverted the logic of Banzhef.
95. See the various positions taken in Petition for Reconsideration and Rehearing on Behalf of Council of Economic Priorities, Project on Corporate Responsibility, and Intervenor
United Fann Workers at 2-5, Fairness Report, supra note 52; Reply Comments of National
Broadcasting Co. at 11-17 & Attachments A & B, Fairness Report, suprO', Comments of Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. (Oct. 12, 1971) at 13-23, Fairness Report, suprO', Loevinger, The
Politics efAdvertising, 15 WM. & MARYL. REv. 1, 8-10 (1973); Simmons, supra note 59, at
1110-13; Comment, supra note 84, at 1444-49; Note, supra note 90, at 776-78.
96. Responding to petitions for reconsideration of the Fairness Report, supra note 52, the
Commission stated:
The Commission was given [by petitioners] inconclusive statistics and told that it should
have held a hearing on the economics of broadcasting before concluding that extension of
the doctrine to product advertising would be detrimental to commercial broadcasting. The
extensive proceedings in this docket provided more than ample opportunity for that question to be raised. Clearly, however, the economic impact on the broadcasting industry was
only one of many factors contributing to our choice of policy, and that factor alone IS not
of such critical importance as to cause a change of policy.
Fairness Report Rehearing, supra note 52, at 698-99.
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turned on the unpersuasive constitutional arguments previously discussed and thus appears arbitrary 97 and contrary to the best interests
of the viewing public.
If, as seems more likely, fear of economic consequences was more
influential than the FCC cared to admit, 98 then any ambiguity about
the fmancial impact of application of the fairness doctrine to product
advertising should be resolved by thorough study. Even if application of the doctrine is found to pose a substantial threat to the current system of privately fmanced broadcasting, broadcasting's first
responsibility must be to the public. Where the fmancial structure of
broadcasting would limit the paramount first amendment "right of
the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic,
moral, and other ideas and experiences," 99 the industry must adapt
itself to the first amendment, not vice versa. 100
Consistent with the policy announced in the Fairness Report, the
FCC has routinely disposed of fairness claims arising from product
advertising. 101 Several of these complaints dealt with the environment OJ' sexism, two of the issues previously suggested as illustrative
of the role of advertising in society. 102 A brief examination of two
such claims will demonstrate the shortcomings of the new fairness
policy.
97. Several citizens' organizations have charged lhat lhe Fairness Report's distinctive treatment of product advertising is arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion in violation of
the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976). See UFW Brief, supra note 90,
at 51-60. But see Public Interest Research Group v. FCC, 522 F.2d 1060, 1066 (1st Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 965 (1976).
98. Many supporters as well as critics of lhe FCC's exclusion of product advertising from
fairness doctrine coverage have assumed lhat lhe economic factor was "critical." See, e.g.,
Simmons, supra note 50, at 1107; Note, supra note 90, at 764.
99. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1968).
100. One commentator has suggested lhat lhe Commission thought it more appropriate to
leave to Congress lhe regulation oflhe sale and advertising of products lhat are dangerous to
heallh or olherwise detrimental to lhe public interest. See Note, supra note 90, at 764. This
argument ignores the possibility lhat product advertising makes important, albeit implicit,
statements concerning controversial issues such as environmental degradation, sexism, or nutrition regardless of lhe actual public danger caused by lhe particular advertised product,
IOI. See Council on Children, Media, and Merchandising v. ABC, 59 F.C.C.2d 448 (1976)
(advertisements directed at children); In re Storer Broadcasting Co., 58 F.C.C,2d 468, 474
(1976) (sex-stereotyped advertisements; license application); In re Complaint by Natl. Health
Federation, 58 F.C.C.2d 314 (1976) (flouride representations in toothpaste advertisements); In
re Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 56 F.C.C.2d 313, 315-16 (1975) (automobile and gasoline
advertisements; license application); In re Application of National Broadcasting Co., 52
F.C.C.2d 273, 287 (1975) (sex-stereotyped advertisements); In re Application of American
Broadcasting Co., 52 F.C.C.2d 98, 116 (1975) (sex-stereotyped advertisements); In re Complaint oflhe Sierra Club, 51 F.C.C.2d 569 (1975) (automobile and gasoline advertisements); In
re Complaint of lhe Sierra Club, 48 F.C.C.2d 617 (1974) (snowmobile advertisements); Peter
C. Herbst, 48 F.C.C.2d 614 (1974), petition far reconsideration denied, 49 F.C.C.2d 411 (1974),
o/.(d. sub nom. Public ;rnterest Research Group v. FCC, 522 F.2d 1060 (1st Cir, 1975), cert,
denied, 424 U.S. 965 (1976) (snowmobile advertisements).
102. See text at notes 25-39 supra.
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One of the fastest growing and most controversial recreational
pastimes in the United States is snowmobiling. While enthusiasts
praise the mobility these vehicles have brought to residents of wintry
northern regions, critics complain of hazards to riders, excessive_
noise, injurious trespassing on private land, and ecological disruption.103 In the winter ,of 1973, as the Maine legislature was studying
proposals for regulating snowmobiles, four snowmobile manufacturers conducted intensive, prime-time advertising campaigns on local
television stations. 104 Although the advertisements made no mention
of the pending legislative proposals, protest letters written to one of
the stations alleged that the commercials stated a controversial viewpoint by associating snowmobile use with "the good life" and by en::couraging disregard of safety, environmental concerns, and private
property rights. When the station failed to respond promptly the
protesters took their case to the FCC and elaborated on many of
their contentions. 105At this point, the s~ation answered that the advertisements raised no fairness question because they did not advocate the "misuse" of snowmobiles. 106 The complainants responded
that whether the issue was characterized as " 'misuse,' " " 'abuse,' "
or " 'proper use,' " the advertisers had involved themselves in a public controversy that triggered fairness obligations. 107
In rejecting the complaint, the FCC conceded that "hazardous
operation, adverse environmental effects and interference with private property rights by snowmobiles may constitute controversial issues,'' but declared that the snowmobile advertisements were not, by
the standard set forth in the Fairness Report, devoted" 'in an obvious and meaningful way to the discussion' " of t4ese issues. 108 The
Commission thus simply reiterated its unrealistic distinction between
advertising content and impact. Although complainants offered no
empirical evidence of the effect of the advertising on the views of
Maine residents, a heavy ad campaign presenting snowmobiles in a
favorable light almost certainly played a part in shaping public attitudes.109 By ignoring this role, the FCC shirked its responsibility to
ensure a fair presentation by broadcasters of opposing viewpoints. 110
103. See Comment, Snowmobiles-A Legislative Program, 1972 Wis. L. REv. 477, 477-79.
104. An advertisement from the campaign is reprinted in note 30 supra. Excerpts from
other advertisements are reproduced in Public Interest Research Group v. FCC, 522 F.2d
1060, 1062, n.2 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 965 (1976).
105. 522 F.2d at 1062.
106. 522 F.2d at 1063.
107. 522 F.2d at 1063 (quoting protesters' complaint).
108. Peter C. Herbst, 48 F.C.C.2d 614, 615-16 (1974), petitionfor reconsideration denied, 49
F.C.C.2d 411 (1974), affd. sub nom. Public Interest Research Group v. FCC, 522 F.2d 1060 (1st
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 965 (1976).
109. See text at notes 15-23 supra.
I IO. It should be noted that the television station had offered to air a single half-hour
discussion program on the pending snowmobile legislation. The complainants took the posi-
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An examination of sexism in product advertising illustrates the
general proposition that advertisements for noncontroversial products may themselves be controversial if the appeal conveys a particular position on an issue of public importance. In 1975, the National
Organization for Women (NOW) petitioned the FCC to deny the
license renewal applications of a television station in New York
City 111 and another in Washington, D.C.112 NOW charged, inter alia,
that in routinely depicting women in both programming and advertising as subservient, incompetent, and frequently ridiculous, the stations had violated the fairness doctrine by presenting a "onedimensional" view on the controversial issue of women's role in society.113 Because the controversy arose in the setting of license renewal
proceedings, the FCC considered petitioners' f~irness doctrine allegations as only one aspect of the licensees' overall performance. 114
Even in this context, however, the Commission gave NOW's fairness
claim very short shrift. Citing the Fairness Report, it concluded that
petitioners' descriptions of the women's roles portrayed in the entertainment programs and product advertising were "too insubstantial or ambiguous for us to determine that the mere playing of the
role transmits any clear or singular message demonstrably linked to
a controversial issue of public importance." 115 In light of research
indicating that televised cultural stereotypes do influence viewer perceptions, 116 the FCC's flat refusal to consider the fairness implications of sexually stereotyped product advertising, though consistent
with the policy announced in the Fairness Report, seems difficult to
justify.
Given the considerable legal and financial resources that have
been and are being expended to persuade or compel the Commission
to include product advertising within the purview of the fairness
doctrine, one must determine how much would be gained by applying the doctrine to product advertising. This determination can best
tion that one program "could not offset months of repeated and continuous ads." 522 F.2d at
1063.
111. In re Application of American Broadcasting Co. (ABC), 52 F.C.C.2d 98 (1975).
112. In re Application of National Broadcasting Co. (NBC), 52 F.C.C.2d 273 (1975),
113. 52 F.C.C.2d 273, 282-85; 52 F.C.C.2d 98, 109-11. Documentation for this allegation
consisted of monitoring and survey projects conducted by NOW. 52 F.C.C.2d at 282-85; 52
F.C.C.2d at 109-11. To demonstrate the existence of a substantial public controversy concerning women's societal role, NOW cited numerous popular and scholarly articles, government
reports, and public opinion polls. ABC, 52 F.C.C.2d at 109. Neither licensee contested this
point. 52 F.C.C.2d at 286; 52 F.C.C.2d at 115.
114. NOW also alleged that the stations had failed to provide programming that met the
needs of women in their co=unities and had engaged in discriminatory employment practices. NBC, 52 F.C.C.2d at 286.
115. NBC, 52 F.C.C.2d at 287. Comparable discussion ofNOW's fairness allegations re•
garding the ABC-owned station appears at 52 F.C.C.2d at 116.
116. See Note, supra note 34, at 152-53; note 37 supra.
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be made by examining the operation of the doctrine as currently applied by the Commission. Clearly the doctrine has not led the broadcast media to offer viewers a spectrum of political and social views.
The Commission has historically deferred to the judgment of the licensee in determining whether a controversial issue has been
raised. 117 If a controversial issue is found, the licensee again enjoys
broad discretion in choosing the format, content of, and spokesperson for the responding broadcasts. 118 Although the Commission disapproves of "imbalance" in the presentation of contrasting
yiewpoints, it has declined to establish a minimum ratio to guarantee
meaningful reply time. 119 Furthermore, in reviewing licensee decisions the Commission has been extremely reluctant to find that a
broadcaster exercised its discretion unreasonably or in bad faith. 120
In exercising such broad discretion at every stage of the fairness process121-to judge what is controversial, who should reply, and how
and when~licensees will generally make judgments reflecting the
cultural biases of their managers and owners, who are typically affluent, white, male, and busin~ss-orlented. 122_ Consequently, the inclusion of product advertising within fairness doctrine coverage, as
the doctrine is presently applied, is unlikely to increase significantly
the presentation of contrasting viewpoints on controversial issues. 123
If, on the other hand, the fairness doctrine were applied to afford
meaningful reply time to all controversial presentations, whether in
advertising or programming, it might seriously threaten the financial
welfare of the broadcast industry. 124 Nearly every commercial on the
117. Fairness Report, supra note 52, at 11. See, e.g., In re Storer Broadcasting Co., 60
F.C.C.2d 1097 (1976); In re Media Access Project, 60 F.C.C.2d 218 (1976).
118. Fairness Report, supra note 52, at 16. See, e.g., Public Media Center v. KATY, 59
F.C.C.2d 494, 517 (1976). In addition, see Comment, supra note 56, at 234, 243 n.43.
119. Fairness Report, supra note 52, at 17. But cf. Public Media Center, 59 F.C.C.2d 494
(1976) (FCC ruling that 8 of 13 licensees failed to afford adequate reply time to political
advertising). For a discussion of the problems of balance, see Comment, supra note 84, at
1436-44.
120. During 1973-1974, the FCC processed 4,280 formal fairness complaints and ruled
against the licensee in only 19 (.4%). Fairness Report Rehearing, supra note 52, at 709 (Commissioner Robinson, dissenting).
121. See generally Note, supra note 90, at 758 n.7.
122. See P. SANDMAN, supra note 15, at 101.
123. The classification of a product advertisement as controversial, which gives rise to the
presentation of views attacking the advertiser's produce, jeopardizes the licensee's financial
interest because the advertiser may refuse to purchase further broadcast time. "Accordingly,
there would be an incentive for the broadcasters not to classify an advertisement as raising
fairness obligations." Comment, supra note 56, at 244-45.
124. Those who suggest that extension of the fairness doctrine to product advertising might
not cut too deeply into broadcasting revenues apparently assume that only limited types of
product advertising would trigger fairness obligations. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 84, at
1446-47. It has been argued in this regard that some controversial paid commercials might be
effectively balanced by other paid commercials, which would fulfill at least part of the licensee's fairness responsibility without any financial burden. For example, phosphate detergent
ads might be countered by ads for nonphosphate detergents, and ads for big cars might be
0
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air might be considered offensive or at least controversial by some
substantial minority of Americans. 125 If these groups were to benefit
fully from the fairness doctrine, the financial burden imposed on
broadcasters would undoubtedly be great. 126
Even within the context of current broadcasting economics, however, the Commission could, by appropriate line drawing, apply the
fairness doctrine in a -manner that recognizes the political and cultural impact of product advertising. Whether an advertisement addresses a controversial issue could be determined by objective
evidence of actual or potential impact on viewer attitudes rather
than by a mechanical examination of the script. To screen out marginal claims of controversy, fairness obligations arising from advertising could be triggered, for example, by findings in an approved
public opinion survey or by the pendency of legislative or administrative action specifically pertinent to the subject matter of the ad. 127
Despite its past vicissitudes, the fairness doctrine continues to
serve the public interest and should not be abandoned. 128 So long as
balanced by ads for small cars. See UFW Brief, supra note 90, at 4 n.l. This argument is
unpersuasive because advertising, even when directly comparative, does not rebut. See
Lazarfeld & Merton, supra note 14, at 476-77. Comparative advertising, however, typically
seeks to increase the advertiser's share of sales in a single product category-e.g., soft drinks,
cigarettes, or a particular class of automobile. This advertising obviously will not challenge
attributes of the product class itself. On the other hand, advertising for competing product
categories, e.g., cigars versus cigarettes, rarely discusses the merits of the product category with
which the advertised product competes.
125. Two sources of legitimate controversy in all product advertising are the ethic of consumption, see text at notes 31-33 supra, and capitalism. See generally BROADCASTING, April
26, 1976, at 39.
If only television advertisements dealing with a few specific issues were deemed to be
controversial, reply broadcasting time could be restricted to allowing general responses to all
advertising raising those issues. Interview with Peter M. Sandman, Associate Professor, The
University of Michigan School of Natural Resources, in Ann Arbor, Michigan (Feb. 1, 1977)
[hereinafter cited as Interview]. However, every advertisement implicates a host of issues,
many of which are controversial to substantial factions of the public. New controversies, moreover, erupt continually.
126. One communications scholar has suggested that the gravest threat to broadcasting
posed by fairness doctrine reply time would be the enhancement of viewers' awareness, which
would deny advertisers a passive audience receptive to subrational commercial appeals. Interview, supra note 125.
127. Cf. Note, supra note 90, at 775, suggesting several criteria for determining whether a
product was controversial, including whether it was related to the subject of an upcoming
referendum, to an election issue in a campaign office, to the subject of pending legislation, or
to the subject of heated debate in the service area of a broadcasting station. The use of such
criteria would serve to remove some of the discretion currently given licensees to determine
whether a controversial issue has been raised, a necessary step if the fairness doctrine is to
ensure the presentation of contrasting views. However, the increased governmental infringe•
ment upon editorial discretion may upset the balance between governmental control and editorial discretion noted as being desirable in Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic
Natl. Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973), discussed in note 78 supra.
128. The fairness doctrine may be linked to the public's first amendment right of access to
information. See Note, Constitutional Ramifications of a Repeal of the Fairness J)octrine, 64
GEO. L.J. 1293 (1976).
The doctrine provides political leverage to groups whose power to influence broad-
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access to the airwaves is limited by technology, 129 oligopoly, 130 or
advertising's imperative to accommodate mass tastes, 131 the fairness
doctrine will remain essential to ensuring some public exposure to
contrasting viewpoints on issues of public importance. However, as
presently applied the fairness doctrine falls far short of its lofty purposes, and the FCC is unlikely to extend even this limited version of
the doctrine to product advertising, the economic basis of the industry. Thus, it is useful to consider other policy tools that might
counter the impact of the implicit messages accompanying product
advertisements.
III.

THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND DECEPTIVE
OR UNFAIR ADVERTISING

Under the authority granted by Congress in section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act 132 the FTC shares jurisdiction over television advertising with the FCC. While the FCC is concerned with
ensuring that broadcasting serves the "public interest" in the
broadest sense, 133 Congress created the Federal Trade Commissi9n
for the specific purpose of protecting the integrity of commerce from
practices deemed predatory or contrary to public policy. 134 Initially
casters is otherwise meager. Much of this leverage will arise because a station may attempt to
acco=odate complainants' concerns rather than incur the expense and adverse publicity of
contesting a fairness complaint. Interview, supra note 125.
129. Although cable television (CATV) has been heralded as a solution to the problems of
limited access to television, its prospects are uncertain. See, e.g., R. LE Due, CABLE TELEVISION AND THE FCC (1973); R. SMITH, THE WIRED NATION (1972); Branscomb, The Cable
Fable: Will It Come True?, J. Com., Winter, 1975, at 44; Comanor & Mitchell, The Costs of
Planning: The FCC and Cable Television, IS J. L. & EcoN. 177 (1972).
130. In April 1972, the Department of Justice filed suits against the three major networks
charging restraint and monopoly of prime-time progra=ing through control of prime-time
access. The National Broadcasting Co. has settled; the other suits are pending. BROADCASTING, Nov. 22, 1976, at 21. In response to a petition by Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., the
FCC has announced a major inquiry into charges that networks dominate broadcasting at the
expense of affiliate and "other progra=ing sources." BROADCASTING, Jan. 17, 1977, at 19.
Barring sudden, radical changes in government policies, however, network domination of the
broadcast industry is likely to continue.
131. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
132. Federal Trade Commission Act§ S(a)(l), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(l) (1976), grants the FTC
authority to regulate "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting co=erce."
133. Mindful of the statutory warning against censorship contained in the Co=unications Act of 1934, § 326, 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1970), and of Justice Brandeis' belief that the best
remedy for fallacious speech is more speech, Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76
(1927) (concurring opinion), the FCC initiated the fairness doctrine so that voices other than
those favored by broadcasters could be heard.
134. This distinction has arisen in the context of FTC jurisdiction over corporate "image"
advertising. Noting limitations imposed by both the FTC Act and the first amendment, the
Commission has ruled that its jurisdiction over deceptive image advertising is restricted to
those of which "the dominant appeal or likely effect" is co=ercial, ie., concerning "the sale
of goods or services or the elicitation of other co=ercial dealings." FTC Letter, supra note 6,
at 55, 424. See generally Ludlam, supra note 6.
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restricted to relationships among competitors, FTC authority now
extends to protection of the consumer as well. 135 Although the FTC's
concern for consumers generally centers around the consumer's role
in commercial transactions, the agency has exercised its jurisdiction
over "unfair" trade pract~ces that threatened injury even where the
potential victims were not actual or prospective consumers. 136 Unlike the FCC, whose remedies are generally limited to prescribing
more speech, the FTC has available a variety of options to remedy
unfair or deceptive practices. Upon determining that -an advertising
practice is unfair or deceptive within the meaning of section 5, the
FTC may order disclosure 137 or correction 138 by the advertiser or
may proscribe the practice by order 139 or rule. 140
The FTC has both the experience and the authority necessary to
confront the problems raised by the power and impact 141 of television advertising. Even though lawyers, and hence most governmental agencies, tend to read an advertisement as if it were a contract by
focusing on the literal meaning of its terms, 142 the FTC has, at least
on occasion, proved itself capable of responding to the reality behind
and beyond the words. For example, 'in 19'64 the Commission, by
requiring a health warning in all cigarette advertisements, recognized that social responsibility to the consumer must accompany the
exercise of the extraordinary power of advertising. Intensive mass
media advertising, the Commission asserted,
is a form of power in the market place-power over the buying choice
of consumers. It is lawful power. But just as the possession of lawfullyacquired market or monopoly power in the antitrust sense may nevertheless place a firm under 3: special duty of fair dealing toward its competitors, an advertiser's possession of great power vis-a-vis consumers
may place him under a special duty of fair dealing toward them. . . .
The duty exists even if no individual advertisement, viewed in isolation, is deceptive under conventional principles. 143

The FTC's response to cigarette advertising thus recognized not
merely the strict meaning of words, but also their actual influence
135. See Developments in the Law---lJeceptiveAdvertising, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1005, 1019-21
(1967) [hereinafter cited as lJeve!opment.i'J.
136. See note 168 infra.
137. See note 174 infra.
138. See note 177 infra and accompanying text.
139. Federal Trade Commission Act, § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 45b (1976).
140. Federal Trade Commission Act, § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 57a (1976).
141. See text at notes 7-9 & 16-47 supra.
142. See J. HOWARD & J. HULBERT, ADVERTISING AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 49-50
(1973) (staff report to the FTC).
143. FTC, Statement of Basis and Purpose of Trade Regulation Rule, Unfair or Deceptive
Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to the Health Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed.
Reg. 8324, 8357 (1964) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter cited as Cigarette Statement].
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and impact. 144
Viewed in this light, the FTC's contribution to the FCC's 1971
inquiry into the fairness issues raised by television advertising 145 is
both intriguing and disappointing. In contrast to the FCC's contentoriented approach to advertising, 146 the FTC emphasized the power
and influence of television advertising 147 and recognized that product advertisements "often raise issues, directly or implicitly, that relate to some of the nation's most serious social problems--drug
abuse, pollution, nutrition and highway safety." 148 Asserting that
its own regulatory tools were inadequate to respond fully to these
problems, 149 the FTC proposed that interested groups be given free
"counter-advertising" time to discuss controversial issues implicitly
raised and negative product attributes left unmentioned by television
product advertisements. 150 This proposal drew vigorous criticism
144. The FTC finds its authority to regulate the implicit messages that affect consumers in

§ 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976). The FTC views that section
as a mandate "to create a new body oflaw-a law of unfair competition adapted to the diverse
and changing needs of the complex and evolving modem American economy." Cigarette
Statement, supra note 143, at 8349 (footnote omitted).
An FTC staff report on advertising notes that, despite the difficulty of transition from
traditional legal analysis, the FTC is "attempting to shift to more behaviorally oriented evaluative criteria." J. HOWARD & J. HULBERT, supra note 142, at 50.
145. See In re The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public
Interest Standards of the Communications Act, Notice of Inquiry, 30 F.C.C.2d 26, 29-33
(1971). The inquiry resulted in issuance of the Fairness Report, supra note 52, discussed in text
at notes 66-100 supra.
146. See text at notes 71-76 & 91-94 supra.
141. See Statement of the FTC Before the FCC, In re The Handling of Public Issues
Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act,
Part III: Access to the Broadcast Media as a Result of Carriage of Product Commercials 2-7
(1972) [hereinafter cited as FTC Statement]. The FTC pointed out that television advertising is
dominated by a relatively small number of corporations. Id. at 4. The FTC also noted:
Advertising today is largely a one-way street. Its usual technique is to provide only one
carefully selected and presented aspect out of a multitude of refevant product characteristics. Advertising may well be the only important form of public discussion where there
presently exists no concomitant public debate. At times, this may produce deception and
aistortion where the self-interest of sellers in disclosure does not coincide witl:i the consumer's interest in information.
All of these elements of the modem-day advertising mechanism combine to endow
broadcast advertising with an enormous power to affect consumer welfare.
Id. at 6-7.
148. Id. at 5.
149. Id. at 11. The Commission noted that, in proceeding through typically prolonged and
costly administrative litigation, the Commission must make difficult choices among cases in
allocating its limited resources. Moreover, litigation "may be a relatively unsatisfactory mechanism for determination of the truth or accuracy of certain kinds of advertising claims" and for
dealing with truthful but controversial advertisements. Id. at 7-8. Requiring substantiation of
advertising claims, the Commission continued, is effective only for claims "objectively verifiable" and is constrained by limited agency resources. Id. at 8-9. Finally, the FTC stated that
disclosure requirements cannot furnish the consumer with all needed product information and
cannot take the place of an advocate's criticism or supplementary presentation. Id. at 9-11.
150. See id. at 11-19; Thain, Advertising Regulation: The Contemporary FTC Approach, 1
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 349, 390-92 (1973).
The FTC recommended that a right of access to broadcasting be afforded for response
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from advertisers-and broadcasters 151 and finally was rejected by the
FCC, which accorded it only cursory discussion in the Fairness Report.1s2
to four categories of product co=ercials. First, such a right would arise to counter
"[a]dvertising asserting claims of product performance or characteristics that explicitly raise
controversial issues of current public importance." FTC Statement, supra note 153, at 13. The
FTC included in this category both corporate image advertising, see notes 6 & 72 supra, and
product claims of, for example, environmental or nutritional benefits. FTC Statement, supra
note 147, at 13. Second, the right to respond would reach "[a]dvertising stressing broad recurrent themes, affecting the purchase decision in a manner that implicitly raises controversial
issues of current public importance." Id. at 14. The FTC elaborated as follows:
Advertising for some product cate~ories implicitly raises issues of current importance
and controversy, such as food ads which may oe viewed as encouraging poor nutritional
habits, or detergent ads which may be viewed as contributing to water pollution. Similarly, some central them'es associated by advertising with various product categories convey general viewpoints and contribute to general attitudes which some persons or groups
may consider to oe contributing factors to social and economic problems of our times. For
example, ads that encourage reliance upon drugs for the resolution of personal problems
may be considered by some groups to be a contributing cause of the problem of drug
misuse.
Id. at 14-15 (footnotes omitted).
The third category of advertising that the FTC felt should give rise to a right to respond
would be "[a]dvertising claims that rest upon or rely upon scientific premises which are currently subject to controversy within the scientific co=unity." Id. at 15. The FTC acknowledged its authority to prohibit as deceptive the presentation or implication of a controversial
claim as established fact, but the Commission suggested that counter-advertising would be
preferable because the public would hear both sides of the debate. Id. at 16-17. Finally, the
right to respond would reach "[a]dvertising that is silent about negative aspects of the advertised product." Id. at 17. As an example, the FTC suggested that
in response to advertising for small automobiles, emphasizing the factor of low cost and
economy, the public cou1d be informed of the views of some J)eople that such cars are
considerably less safe than larger cars. On the other hand, ads for big cars, emphasizing
the factors of safety and comfort, could be answered by counter-ads concerning the
greater pollution arguably generated by such cars. In response to advertising for -some
foods, emphasizing various nutritional values and benefits, the public might be informed
of the views of some people that consumption of some other food may be a superior
source of the same nutritional values and benefits.
Id. at 18.
151. See, e.g., Response of the American Association of Advertising Agencies to Statement
. of the Federal Trade Commission, The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine
and the Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act (1972); Reply Co=ents of the
National Association of Broadcasters [NAB] to the Statement of the Federal Trade Commission, The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest
Standards of the Communications Act, Part III: Access to the Broadcast Media as a Result of
Carriage of Product Co=ercials (1972). The NAB asserted that, "through its proposals, the
FTC, the agency charged with the duty to police advertising, is sidestepping its own statutory
responsibilities and attempting to foist on the FCC and the public obligations which neither is
equipped to assume." Id. at 4. The NAB went on to state that "[t]he public interest is ill-served
by an administrative agency which fails to make every effort to discharge its statutory duties,
no matter how overwhelming or onerous they may seem." Id. at 10.
152. See Fairness Report, supra note 52, at 26-28. As to the first two categories of advertising that the FTC felt should give rise to a right to respond, see note 150 supra, the FCC simply
referred to its prior conclusion that product commercials cannot meaningfully address public
issues. See text at notes 74-76 supra. Generally, the FCC complained that the FTC's categories
"seem to include virtually all existing advertising. . . . We believe that the adoption of the
FTC proposal-wholly apart from a predictable adverse economic effect on broadcasting-might seriously divert the attention and resources of broadcasters from the traditional
purposes of the fairness doctrine." The FCC concluded: "We do not believe that the fairness
doctrine provides an appropriate vehicle for the correction of false and misleading advertising." Fairness Report, supra note 52, at 26-27.
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The FTC "counter-advertising'' proposal is intriguing because it
represented both an innovative, if unpolished, attempt to grapple
with the social and political impacts of television product advertising
and an unusually candid call for help from one federal agency to
another. The proposal was disappointing, however, because the FTC
itself already possessed ample authority to respond creatively to the
serious and complex problems in this field.
Traditionally the FTC has concerned itself only with deceptive
advertising-a concept broad enough to reach many of the objectionable features of television commercials. Advertising that is literally truthful may be unlawfully deceptive in the "general
impression" it conveys to the "populace" about a product. 153 Moreover, unlawful misrepresentation is not confmed to the particulars of
the product itself, but may also concern such "extrinsic" factors as
the country of its origin or the scope of the manufacturer's business.154
Frequently the impressions conveyed by product advertisements
are at least partially the result of subtle psychological techniques.
Television commercials are not deceptive merely because they use
psychological appeals 155 to convey a favorable product image.
Rather, they are deceptive because the images they convey are often
153. Charles of the Ritz Distrib. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676,679 (2d Cir. 1944). The FTC
need only determine that an advertisement has the capacity to deceive, not that actual deception has occurred. 143 F.2d at 679. Thus, the FTC employs the standard not of the reasonable
person, but rather of "the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous." Aronberg v. FTC, 132
F.2d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1942).
154. See, e.g., FTC v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212 (1933) (firm calling itself a "milling
company" did not grind flour); Mohawk Ref. Corp. v. FTC, 263 F.2d 818 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 814 (1959) (re-refined oil not so labeled); Manco Watch Strap Co., Inc., 60
F.T.C. 495 (1962) (product's foreign origin not disclosed). See generally Note, "Extrinsic Misrepresentations" in Advertising Under Section 5(a) ofthe Federal Trade Commission Act, 114 U.
PA. L. REV. 725 (1966).
False implications about facts such as the environmental impact of an automobile or
the nutritional value of a food item often interfere with rational consumer product selection in
much the same manner as does false information about a product's origin or the scope of a
manufacturer's business. See Note, The Regulation of Corporate Image Advertising, 59 MINN.
L. REV. 189, 210 (1972). In many cases, misinformation about impact or nutrition would bear
much more directly on consumer decisions, given the current concern for the environment and
nutrition.
155. Demand is inevitably both economic and psychological. See J. HOWARD & J. HULBERT, supra note 142, at 82-83. Psychological "self-concept" appeals are, of course, inherent in
certain product categories, such as cosmetics and clothes. Id at 54. Numerous studies have
demonstrated that the informational content of advertising bears little or no relation to
changes in the viewers' attitudes or behavior. See, e.g., Haskins, Factual Recall as a Measure of
Advertising Effectiveness, J. ADVERTISING RESEARCH, March 1964, at 2. As psychologist Roger
Brown has put it, "[w]e should not expect a symbol-using animal to live by meat and drink
alone." R. BROWN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 568 (1965).
Given that demand is both economic and psychological, suggestions that the psychological component be purged from advertising and that the consumer be permitted to make
a purely "rational" choice, see, e.g., Reed, supra note 21, at 180-82; Note, Psychological Advertising: A New Area ofFTC Regulation, 1972 WIS. L. REV. 1097, 1108-11, are misdirected.

526

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 76:498

false, in that they are contradicted by undisclosed facts. Such psychological appeals should, if not factually substantiated, 156 at least
not be at odds with provable reality.
Advertising need not be a comprehensive consumer's guide that
sets forth every merit and demerit of a product potentially relevant
to the purchasing decision. However, the law of deceptive advertising does forbid misrepresentation of facts, even "extrinsic" facts, capable of affecting a significant number of purchasers' decisions. 157
This principle, in conjunction with the "general impression" test discussed earlier, 158 offers an appropriate standard for disclosure: information directly contrary to a factual impression conveyed by an
advertisement must be presented when it is likely to affect the consumption decisions of a substantial number of persons. Obviously,
that standard requires informed and thoughtful line drawing, which
can best be developed on a gradual, case-by-case basis. 159 Properly
applied, the FTC authority to regulate deceptive advertising could
156. An FTC staff report has proposed that substantiation requirements be applied to im•
plicit psychological claims as well as to factual claims. See J. HOWARD & J. HULBERT, supra
note 142, at 54. The practical difficulties of this approach appear obvious: it may be interpreted as a back-door attempt to eliminate psychological appeals altogether, which is an impossibility.
157. Whether tacit or explicit, a misrepresentation is unlawful if material-that is, if it is
capable of affecting the purchasing decisions of a substantial number of consumers. See Cigarette Statement, supra note 143, at 8352; J)eve/opmenls, supra note 135, at 1056-63.
158. See note 153 supra.
159. The FTC made this point when it required cigarette advertising to disclose the health
hazards of smoking:
[T)he principle reguiring disclosure of a product's hazards in labeling and advertising
should not be applied mechanically or uncritically, or pushed to an absurd extreme. It can
be applied only on the basis of the SJ;>ecific and concrete facts and circumstances pertaining to the product involved. . . . It 1s a question of judgment. . . .
Cigarette Statement, supra note 143, at 8363. At that time, the FTC argued that cigarettes were
distinguishable from other hazardous products promoted by mass media advertising. Id. at
8361-63.
More recently, the Commission has rejected a petition for rulemaking based on impression-disclosure theory. Senator James Abourezk (D.-S.D.), noting that "advertisers frequently
exploit a general consumer preference to purchase from a small or family-owned company" by
the use of misleading brand names or appeals, requested that the FTC require disclosure of the
advertiser's parent corporation. Letter from Senator Abourezk (co-signed by five other senators) to Mr. Calvin J. Collier, FTC Chairman (April 5, 1976) (on file at the Michigan Law
Review). Senator Abourezk cited as examples Pepperidge Farm baked goods (Campbell Soup
Co.), Sara Lee baked goods (Consolidated Foods Corp.), and Celeste Pizza, advertised as
"'Mama's' Old Family Recipe" (Quaker Oats). News Release of Sen. James Abourezk (Apr.
5, 1976) (on file at the Michigan Law Review). Abourezk also asserted that such disclosure
would help counteract specious product differentiation by a single manufacturer-for example, detergent manufacturers that create an illusion of meaningful competition. Id. In denying
the petition, the FTC stated that it lacked evidence either that current practice misleads a
significant number of persons to their detriment or that a consumer preference for small manufacturers exists. The acquisition of such evidence, according to the Commission, would require the expenditure of significant resources. Furthermore, it stated that mere disclosure of
corporate affiliation would not better inform the consumer about the product. Letter from the
Federal Trade Commission (Charles A. Tobin, Secretary) to Senator James Abourezk (June
15, 1976) (on file at Michigan Law Review).
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go a long way toward alleviating much of the objectionable impact
of television commercials.
The deceptiveness cfoctrine is not the only standard available to
FTC regulation of television advertising, since the Commission also
has authority to prohibit commercial practices that are "unfair." In
recent years attention within and without the Commission has focused increasingly upon the question whether an advertisement that
is not strictly "deceptive" may nonetheless be considered "unfair."
The Supreme Court's opinion in FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson
Co., 160 though arising in the general context of antitrust principles
rather than advertising, 161 gave an expansive reading to the Commission's authority to regulate "unfair" commercial practices. Noting the "sweep and flexibility" of the FTC's mandate, 162 the Court
stated that
the Federal Trade Commission does not arrogate excessive power to
itself if, in measuring a practice against the elusive, but congressionally
mandated standard of fairness, it, like a court of equity, considers public values beyond simply those enshrined in the letter or encompassed
in the spirit of the antitrust laws. 163

Continuing in a footnote, the Court cited, with apparent approval, 164 criteria adopted by the Commission for determining
whether a practice that is not deceptive is nonetheless unfair:
(1) whether the practice, without necessarily having been previously
considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established
by statutes, the common law, or otherwise-whether, in other words, it
is within at least the penumbra of some common-law, statutory, or
other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial
injury to consumers (or competitors or other businessmen). 165

Notwithstanding the expansive reading given to the scope of the
FTC unfairness authority in Sperry & Hutchinson, the encouragement of commentators, 166 and the public statements of its staff, 167
the Commission has made only limited efforts to give substance to
160. 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
161. The Court's discussion in Sperry & Hutchinson demonstrates that its reasoning applies
to the full breadth.of FTC authority. Neither FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bros., Inc., 291 U.S. 304
(1934), relied upon by the Court in Sperry & Hutchinson, 405 U.S. at 242-43, nor the FTC's
unfairness criteria, quoted in text at note 165 supra, involved antitrust considerations.
162. 405 U.S. at 241.
163. 405 U.S. at 244.
164. See Note, supra note 155, at 1108-11.
165. 405 U.S. at 244-45 (citing Cigarette Statement, supra note 157, at 8355).
166. See, e.g., Note, supra note 155, at 1106-11.
167. In 1971, Gerald J. Thain, then-Assistant Director for Food and Drug Advertising of
the FTC's Bureau of Consumer Protection, anticipating the favorable decision in Sperry &
Hutchinson, discussed "the Unfairness Doctrine" as an emerging theory of FTC regulation of
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its unfairness authority in the advertising field. 168 Just as psychologiadvertising. Thain, Consumer Protection: Advertising-The FTC Response, 26 FooD, DRUO,
CosM. L.J. 609, 616•23 (1971). He stated that
the Unfairness Doctrine ... is potentially of great value in dealing with exploitive or
ineguitable practices that do not fall within established categories of unfair or deceptive
activity. In my view, it is exceedingly important that the Commission develop such tools,
for it JS becoming increasingly apparent that traditional approaches are not adequate to
deal with the problems created 6y modem mass media advertising. . . . The consumer,
unwary of the new advertising techniques, is placed in a vulnerable and easily exploitable
position. . . . Since television occupies a central place in most households, the viewer is
continuously en~ulfed with messages which educate, messages which set standards, and
messages which mstill drives. Attitudes and life styles are most certainly influenced by the
medium. Thus, the importance of understanding the new television advertising, as well as
new advertising in general, cannot be overemphasized.
Id. at 621·22. Two years later, his initial optimism tempered by experience, Mr. Thain reported that "[d]ealing with advertising other than that which is simply misinformative •.• has
been ... difficult. However, the Commission of the 1970's will, in my judgment, be compelled
to focus increasingly on these problems." Thain, supra note 150, at 393.
More recently, Richard B. Herzog, Assistant Director of the FTC's Division of National
Advertising, Bureau of Consumer Protection, has suggested that the FTC has the authority to
proceed against advertising that can be shown to encourage abuse of alcohol. Statement of
Richard B. Herzog Before the Subcommittee on Alcoholism and Narcotics, Senate Committee
on Labor and Public Welfare (March 11, 1976) (on file at Michigan Law Review). Noting that
§ 5 prohibitions of unfairness and deceptiveness reach "implied representations" even if not
intended by the advertiser, Mr. Herzog stated that "an ad would be particularly suspect if it
suggested-frankly or, perhaps, symbolically-that alcoholic beverages are a means of coping
with social or emotional difficulties, including loneliness, frustration, or tension, or if it portrayed behavior or personality characteristics distinctively present in alcohol abusers." Id. at 5.
However, Mr. Herzog cautioned that the lack of conclusive evidence of the actual impact of
such advertising is a "basic constraint" on governmental response. Id. at 1I.
168. The Commission has proceeded under its § 5 authority against television advertising
practices that may result in physical injury to children. See Uncle Ben's, Inc., 3 TRADE REo.
REP. (CCH) ~ 21,246 (1976) (commercial showing child placing her face close to pot of boiling
rice); General Foods Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ~ 20,928 (1975) (commercial suggesting that wild plants are edible). Cf. Philip Morris, Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ~
20,153 (1972) (distribution of sample razor blades in home-delivered newspapers). Absent a
threat of physical injury, however, the Commission has exercised little initiative in the area of
nondeceptive unfair advertising.
Presumably the easiest cases for use of the unfairness theory involve advertising directed at children. Since children are an especially vulnerable audience, too young and inexperienced to respond discriminatingly to commercial appeals, extraordinary legal protections
have traditionally been extended to them. See FTC Staff Statement on the Application of the
Federal Trade Commission Act to Television Advertising of Child-Directed Premiums, Proposed Industry Guide, 39 Fed. Reg. 25505, 25505-10 (1974). Moreover, the landmark case
establishing the FTC's power to proceed against ''unfair" practices not otherwise unlawful,
FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bros., 291 U.S. 304 (1934), concerned a lottery-type scheme promoting
the sale of candy to children, who were deemed by the Court to be "unable to protect themselves." 291 U.S. at 313. Until very recently, however, the Commission had declined to find
any inherent deception or unfairness in television food advertising directed at children. Letter
from the FTC to Action for Children's Television, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ~ 50,229 (1975).
See also ITT Continental Baking Co., 83 F.T.C. 865 (1973), modified, 83 F.T.C. 1105 (1973),
enfarcement of order as modified granted, 532 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1976), discussed in note 194
infra. It abandoned its proposal to prohibit television food advertising directed at children that
uses premiums or sweepstakes. Wall St. J., Mar. 15, 1977, at 2, col. 4. In 1976, however, the
FTC approved a consent order prohibiting children-oriented vitamin advertisements that featured Spider-Man, a popular television and comic book hero. See Hudson Pharmaceutical
Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ~ 21,191 (1976). Although the complaint leading to the
consent order alleged both deceptiveness and unfairness, the advertisements were not deceptive in the traditional sense.
,
Finally, on February 28, 1978, the Commission initiated rulemaking proceedings to

January 1978]

Television Product Advertising

529

cal appeals in television product advertising are not "deceptive"
merely because they are psychological, 169 neither are they necessarily "unfair." However, at the very least, advertising appeals should
be considered unfair under the "substantial injury to consumers" test
where their cumulative effect can be shown to be harmful to viewers'
mental health. 17° Furthermore, as the Court in Sperry & Hutchinson
suggested, the public policies expressed in statutory and common
law present an additional basis for a finding of unfairness. 171 Consequently, television commercials should also be considered "unfair"
when they exploit and cultivate desires and prejudices that contradict societal principles manifested in American law. 172
consider strict generic regulation of children's television advertising. See note 2 supra. In support of its proposals, the staff report reasoned:
The remedy described in paragraph (a) follows from the conclusion that televised
advertising directed to children too young to understand the selling purpose of, or otherwise comErehend or evaluate, commercials is inherently unfair and deceptive. The remedy descnbed in paragraph (b) reflects the conclusion that the most canogenic sugared
products should not be advertised to children on television. The remedy described m (c)
reflects the view that those products of lesser cariogenicity should be advertised to children only if balanced by nutritional and/or health disclosures addressed to that group.
4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ~ 38,046 (1978).
The FTC has never found an advertisement directed at adults to be unfair unless it was
also deceptive. Although some cases of deceptive advertising involve messages that seem offensive or unfair regardless of their truthfulness, the Commission has relied essentially on the
deceptiveness theory. See, e.g., Savitch v. FTC, 218 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1955); J.B. Williams Co.
(1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ~ 19,671 (1971).
169. See note 155 supra and accompanying text.
170. See 405 U.S. at 244 n.5, quoted in text at note 165 supra ("substantial injury to consumers"). The FTC has already proceeded against advertising appeals endangering the physical health of viewers. See note 168 supra.
171. 405 U.S. at 244, quoted in text at note 163 supra.
On at least one occasion, the FTC staff has, apparently without considering whether its
concerns were consistent with public values, attempted to proscribe advertisements that were
alleged to exploit consumer concerns unfairly. In ITT Continental Baking Co., 83 F.T.C. 865,
modffeed and qffd., 532 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1976), the FTC's complaint alleged that respondent's
advertisements were ''unfair" because they tended ''to exploit the emotional concerns" of parents for the healthy growth of their children by misrepresenting the nutritional value of Wonder Bread and tended ''to exploit the guilt feelings [of mothers] regarding the nutritional effect
of snack cakes on children's diets" by misrepresenting the nutritional value of Hostess snack
cakes. 83 F.T.C. at 872, 874. The FTC, reasoning that these unfairness allegations relied on the
falseness of the advertising claims, declined to consider their unfairness as a separate issue. 83
F.T.C. at 962-64.
172. This standard would require precisely the kind of judgment the Supreme Court endorsed in Sperry & Hutchinson, 405 U.S. 233 (1972), discussed in the text at notes 161-65 supra.
Application of the standard in the illustrative subject areas of environment, sexism, and nutrition is discussed in the text at notes 178-204 supra.
This standard is similar to the kind ofjudgment suggested by Margaret Mead when she
called for the development of "an ethic of communications" that would insist that "the audience be seen as composed of individuals who could not be manipulated but could only be
appealed to in terms of their systematic cultural strengths." Mead, supra note 20, at 343. Dr.
Mead gave an example in the nutrition field: "It would . . . be regarded as ethical to try to
persuade the American people to drink orange juice as a pleasant and nutritional drink by
establishing a style of breakfast, a visual preference for oranges, and a moral investment in
good nutrition, but not by frightening individual mothers into serving orange juice for fear
that they would lose their children's love, or their standing in the community." Id. at 343.
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This standard would require careful and delicate judgments on
the part of the FTC and would not permit regulation of commercial
appeals simply because bureaucrats-or even the. great majority of
society-deemed them distasteful or improper. Absent convincing
scientific proof of harm to viewers, only a forceful expression in law
of societal values would suffice to invoke the FTC's jurisdiction. The
Commission's task in determining fairness would not be to divine
the prevailing mood of the nation, but to apply the nation's own
carefully weighed and reasoned judgments of fairness expressed in
its statutes and judicial decisions. The values to be discerned do not
involve norms or preferences-hedonism versus puritanism, cooperation versus self-reliance, heterosexuality versus homosexuality-but
involve fundamental societal principles articulated in law. Thus, although a racist advertisement might be tolerated by a majority of the
population, the fundamental principles of American law declare that
appeal unfair. Should the Commission attempt to project its own
values upon the public rather than limit its activity to those areas in
which societal values have been clearly articulated, Congress and the
courts could correct it.
Once the Commission determines that a particular advertisement
or a series of advertisements are deceptive or unfair, it must fashion
an appropriate remedy. As the Commission has recognized, 173 much
of the unfairness, deceptiveness, and controversial nature of product
advertising lies in its relentless one-sidedness, its failure to reveal information needed by consumers in making purchasing decisions.
Consequently, a useful remedy in deception cases has been to require disclosure of material facts. 174 Some unfair advertising appeals
may be so patently offensive or harmful that a cease and desist order
directed toward the noxious commercial is proper.175
Often no single advertisement is responsible for the unfair impact, which results rather from the reinforcement of a similar pernicious message or theme by numerous advertisements. 176 In such
173. See text at note 150 supra.
174. Where an advertisement materially misleads by silence, the Co=ission may require
disclosure of material facts. See FTC Statement of Basis and Purpose, Trade Regulation Rule,
Care Labeling of Textile Wearing Apparel, 36 Fed. Reg. 23,883, 23,889 (1971); Cigarette Statement, supra note 143, at 835 I. It is clear that disclosure of material information in a thirty- or
sixty-second television co=ercial is not always practical.
175. The Supreme Court upheld this approach to unfairness advertising in FTC v. R.F.
Keppel & Bros., Inc., 291 U.S. 304 (1934), discussed in note 168 supra. In addition, see the
physical injury cases cited in note 168 supra.
176. See Cigarette Statement, supra note 143, at 8357; Silverstein & Silverstein, supra note
34, at 73; Note, supra note 34, at 177-78. The FTC has stated that
[i]n the conventional false and misleading advertisinf- case it is not unusual to consider the
challenged advertisement apart from the respondent s-and the industry's-total advertising. This is a satisfactory :procedure where the source of public injury or consumer exploitation lies essentially within the four comers of the advertisement, m the claims made
or facts left undisclosed. It is less satisfactory where the cumulative effect of massive and
long-continued advertising throughout an entire industry, in contrast to the effect of a
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cases the FTC has the authority to require corrective advertising at
the advertiser's expense to remedy the lingering effects of unfair or
misleading practices. 177 Where advertising has created a deceptive
impression, the corrective advertisements can supply the supplementary information necessary for informed consumer choice. Where
advertising has had an unfair impact, the corrective advertisements
can offer complementary, balancing messages to mitigate or cure the
unfairness.
Thus far the discussion of the deceptiveness and unfairness principles and the remedies available to the Commission has been very
general. Their application in three illustrative areas of current concern-the environment, sexism, and nutrition-should help clarify
them as well as demonstrate the role the FTC can play in regulation
of the content and impact of television commercials.
Consumers' purchasing decisions, as noted previously, 178 affect
the environment. Conversely, the environment--or, more precisely,
consumers' perceptions of it-affects their purchasing decisions.
Opinion surveys continue to find a high level of public concern over
environmental and energy problems. 179 The frequency of advertisements extolling the environmental beneficence 180 and energy efficiency of various products indicates that this concern is reflected in
consumer purchase decisions. Where advertisers have sought expressly to exploit this concern, the FTC has held them to a strict
standard of truthfulness. 181 Many advertisements, however, either
attempt more subtly to associate environmental values with a particsingle advertisement or particular advertisements, is itself a source of substantial and unjustifiable injury to the consuming public.
Cigarette Statement, supra note 143, at 8357.
177. See Warner-Lambert Co., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ~
21,066, at 20,934-35 (1975), qi.ft/. as mod!fied, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S.
Ct. 1575 (1978); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 398, 464-74 (1972), qffd., 481 F.2d 246
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1112 (1973); ITT Continental Baking Co., 83 F.T.C. 865, 97172, mod!fied, 83 F.T.C. 1105 (1973), enforcement ofmod!fied order granted, 532 F.2d 207 (2d
Cir. 1976). ,See generally Cornfeld, A New Approach to an Old Remedy: Corrective Advertising
and the Federal Trade Commission, 61 IOWA L. REv. 693 (1976); Comment, Corrective Advertising-The New Response to Consumer Deception, 72 CoLUM. L. REv. 415 (1972).
178. See note 28 supra.
119. See, eg., OPINION RESEARCH CORP., PuBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD ENVIRONMENTAL
TRADEOFFS (1975). This study reported that 60% of those surveyed expressed a willingness to
pay Wgher prices in order to protect the environment and that a 48% plurality preferred Wgher
automobile prices to eliminating pollution-control devices.
180. See D. RUBIN & D. SACHS, MAss MEDIA AND THE ENVIRONMENT 114-49 (1973);
Sandman, supra note 27.
181. See Standard Oil of Cal., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ~
20,789 (1974). In ruling that advertisements claiming extraordinary antipollution qualities for
a brand of gasoline were deceptive, the FTC stated:
The challenged . . . aavertisements are examples of the type of advertising whlch
focuses on serious anxieties of consumers resulting from heated public discussion of issues
such as environmental protection; individual and public health; job, home, and auto
safety; economic woes such as shortages and inflation; etc. . . . In our opinion, it is incumbent upon advertisers who seek to advance their own interests in even partial reliance
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ular product notwithstanding the product's actual adverse environmental impact or are simply silent about the environmental impact
of the product being promoted. Snowmobile advertisements, for example, typically picture carefree enjoyment of the product in pristine
wilderness settings without making reference to the destructive effects of snowmobiling on wilderness ecosystems. 182 Similarly, automobile commercials often present the product against a backdrop of
idyllic nature-coastal vistas, small farms, grassy fields, and the like;
the role of the automobile in urban congestion and air pollution is
understandably ignored. 183 In these circumstances-where advertising creates impressions material to consumer choice and clearly rebuttable by reference to appropriate facts-disclosure principles 184
should require that these facts be presented to the viewers.
Disclosure principles do not require that adve~isers "tell all"
about their products and business. Rather, they only require a fair
presentation of facts concerning a particular issue raised by the advertisement. Automobile commercials with heavy doses of pastoral
imagery clearly imply that automobiles are clean, pristine machines.
If that impression influences consumer purchase decisions, disclosure of corrective information is warranted. These corrective advertisements, however, would not have to disclose other facts that might
influence consumer choice but that are unrelated to issues raised by
the commercial, such as a problem with a trunk latch reported by
some owners, a labor dispute involving the manufacturer, or the
.manufacturer's investments in foreign countries in which human
rights are allegedly denied. If an advertisement cannot be said to
open the door to these subjects by its own explicit or implicit repreon such serious consumer concerns to exercise an extra measure of caution in order to be
certain that their representations to consumers will not deceive or mislead.
Id. at 20,656.
182. See Public Interest Research Group v. FCC, 522 F.2d 1060, 1062 (1st Cir. 1975), See
also Comment, supra note 103, at 477.
183. q: Friends of the Earth v. FCC, 449 F.2d 1164, 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (FCC required
to extend to certain gasoline and automobile commercials the fairness doctrine as applied to
cigarette commercials).
184. See text at notes 156-59 supra. As the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit has stated, "[w]here a controversial issue with potentially grave consequences is left to
each individual to decide for himself, the need for an abundant and ready supply of relevant
information is too obvious to need belaboring." Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1089 (D.C.
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
Application of disclosure principles in the environmental area would further the congressional policy declared in the Environmental Education Act § l(a), 20 U.S.C. § 153l(a)
(1970):
The Con&ress of the United States finds that the deterioration of the quality of the Nation's environment and of its ecological balance poses a serious threat to the strength and
vitality of the people of the Nation and is in part due to poor understanding of the Nation's environment and of the need for ecolo&ical balance; that presently there do not exist
adequate resources for educating and informmg citizens in these areas, and that concerted
efforts in educating citizens about environmental quality and ecological balance are therefore necessary.
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sentations, no disclosure obligation would arise. If, on the other
hand, the advertisement boasts of "a trouble-free trunk" or "the corporation with a conscience," it might trigger disclosure obligations.185 Nor does this-standard for disclosure reach the larger social
issues in a consumer society that are only tangentially raised by a
particular product advertisement. Implicit endorsements of conspicuous consumption, frivolous technology, and novelty for its own
sake are not factual representations, but social judgments. Consequently, no contrary "facts" exist to be disclosed.
While commercials that make implicit or explicit deceptive statements about the environmental impact of particular products should
be subject to disclosure requirements, whether appeals that simply
foster antienvironmental attitudes can be deemed "unfair" within
the meaning of section 5 raises a more difficult question. Although
the nation's policy in favor of environmental quality is manifest, 186
the details of that policy are the subject of vigorous debate. The
FTC's authority to protect the consumer from unfair and harmful
commercial appeals does not permit it to choose among political
viewpoints. A finding of unfairness should rest only upon a demonstration of a controlling national value or of palpable harm of the
kind suggested in Sperry & Hutchinson. 187
185. Another example is provide$! by an advertisement for canned tuna. Claims of good
flavor, nutrition, or convenience do not implicate the question of porpoise mortality associated
with the commercial tuna industry. Representations that hook-and-line fishing is used to catch
individual tuna, however, would require disclosure of actual netting techniques and their• danger to porpoises if porpoise mortality were shown to affect the purchasing choi~s of a substantial number of consumers.
186. See The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 433l(a)
(1970):
The Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man's activity on the interrelations
of all components of the natural environment, particularly the profound influences of
population growth, hi~-density urbanization, industrial expansion, resource exploitation,
ana new and expanding technological advances and recognizing further the critical importance of restoring and maintaining environmental quality to the overall welfare and
oevelopment of man, declares that it is the continuing policy of the Federal Government,
in coo_peration with State and local governments, and other concerned public and private
organizations, to use all practicable means and measures, including financial and technical assistance, in a manner calculated to foster and promote the general welfare, to create
and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony,
and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future generations
of Americans.
In addition, see Environmental Education Act, § l(a), 20 U.S.C. § 153l(a) (1970), quoted in
note 184 supra, Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1251
(Supp. V 1975); Clean Air Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1970).
187. See text at notes 165 & 170-71 supra. It may be that the nation is fast approaching the
formulation of a controlling value favoring energy conservation. See, e.g., Energy Policy and
Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6201-6422 (Supp. V 1975); N.Y. Times, April 19, 1977, at 24,
col. I (text of one of President Carter's energy addresses). If such a value develops and is
manifested in law, the FTC could require corrective advertising or restrict commercial appeals
encouraging wasteful energy practices because of unfairness to consumers.
It may be argued persuasively that the pervasive presentation of only one perspective-the business perspective-of the environmental issue, or of any issue, is itself an unfair
practice because it is antidemocratic. Interview, supra note 125. However, general arbitration

534

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 76:498

The principle of deceptiveness is particularly suited for application to commercials promoting controversial products, such as snowmobiles, that frequently do not disclose the information necessary
for rational consumer decisionmaking with respect to the subject of
the controversy. Consequently, under this analysis the FTC has authority to remedy a substantial amount of the objectionable impact
of advertisements for controversial products. It is more difficult to
establish a basis for the Commission's authority to regulate the impact of advertisements that present only one side of an important
issue in a context other than the promotion of a controversial product. 188 FTC action in such cases would be limited to the exercise of
its authority under the unfairness doctrine. Advertisements employing sex-role stereotyping provide an illustration of the potential application of this doctrine.
Emerging national values and accumulating evidence of harm
converge to suggest that, under the Sperry & Hutchinson test, perva'sive sex-role stereotyping in television advertising is unfair to viewers. Numerous statutes and court decisions evince a national policy
against this stereotyping where it results in invidious discrimination
against women. 189 Moreover, pervasive media stereotyping reduces
freedom of choice for both sexes and may adversely affect the
mental health of viewers. 190 Although women and men alike may
disagree on the propriety of special benefits and protections to be
afforded women, the principles of equal opportunity and freedom of
choice seem so clearly approved in American law that the FTC may
take effective action against sex-role stereotyping without having to
choose among several seriously competing political viewpoints.
Remedial action to counter sex-role stereotyping in television
commercials might take one or both of two forms. The first would
require advertisers to promote freedom of choice in sex roles through
their regular product advertising, such as by representing more women in professional roles and more men performing household
chores. The second alternative, corrective advertising, would explicitly promote freedom of choice in sex roles through advertisements
similar to the "anti-cigarette" messages used to discourage smoking.191 Given that the problem of stereotyping arises not from any
of demands for television access to reply to the social and political bias of advertising exceeds
the essentially co=ercial jurisdiction of the FTC. The solution of this broader problem rests
with the Federal Co=unications Commission and with Congress.
188. An advertisement promoting a controversial product may pose the same difficulty if
the controversial nature of the product is unrelated to the important issue presented in an
unfair manner. An example is an advertisement employing sex-role stereotyping in the promotion of an automobile.
189. See the statutes and cases cited and discussed in Note, supra note 34, at 171-75.
190. See text at notes 36-39 supra.
191. Because responsibility for sex-role stereotyping in television commercials is widely
shared, fmancing the corrective advertising poses practical problems. Perhaps the most equita•
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particular advertising theme or practice but from the similar content
of many advertisements, 192 these counter-advertisements might be
the better remedy. Despite the FTC's apparent authority and the
remedies available, the Commission has taken no action with respect
to sex-role stereotyping in product commercials.
Food advertising on television presents the strongest case for vigorous Commission action under both disclosure and unfairness principles. It is also an area in which the Commission has already been
relatively active, thus far with unimpressive results. The Commission
staff has negotiated consent orders proscribing false or deceptive nutritional claims. 193 When hearing contested staff complaints, however, the Commission has been reluctant to find misrepresentation
by implication or innuendo. 194 Although the Commission has proble solution would be to assess television advertisers collectively for the cost of corrective
messages, excepting those advertisers who could demonstrate to the FTC's satisfaction that
their advertising generally does not represent stereotyped sex roles.
192. See note 176 supra.
193. See, e.g., Carnation Co., (1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ~
20,566 (1974) (representation of a chocolate drink as the nutritional equivalent of milk); Amstar Corp., (1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ~ 20,356 (1973) (claim that
sugar is a unique source of energy, strength, and stamina); Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc.,
[1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. ~ 19,981 (1972) (claim that cranberry juice is
more nutritious than alternative breakfast juices). All three consent orders required disclosures
or corrective advertising.
194. Coca-Cola Co., 83 F.T.C. 746 (1973), involved a classic case of nutritional countereducation by television advertising. See text at notes 42-46 supra. The complaint alleged, inter
alia, that advertising for Hi-C fruit drinks misrepresented the product as (I) "'The Sensible
Drink,' nutritionally and economically, as a source of vitamin C,'' (2) "made with fresh fruit
and [having] a high fruit content comparable to fresh fruits and fruit juices,'' (3) "unqualifiedly
good for children,'' and (4) "particularly high in vitamin C content even as compared to . . .
citrus fruit juices." 83 F.T.C. at 751.
In affirming the initial decision of the administrative law judge dismissing the complaint, the FTC found that ''the advertising representations made in behalf of Hi-C are not
reasonably likely to have communicated the comparisons and claims of equivalence to citrus
juices •.. so critical to the allegations advanced by complaint counsel" 83 F.T.C. at 818. The
FTC also ruled that the express claims that the product was "made from fresh fruit" and
"made with real fruit" did not suggest
that Hi-C is made with fresh fruit, in the specific sense that unprocessed fruit was used in
the manufacturing process. . . . [C]onsumers would not be reasonably likely to take this
meaning from these words. The claims are true in the sense that the fruit components of
the product are made from fresh fruit rather than from artificial or synthetic ingredients,
and consumers are likely to so interpret the representation, based upon their unoerstanding of canned unrefrigerated fruit drinks.
83 F.T.C. at 812 (footnotes omitted). Commissioner Jones dissented:
The Hi-C commercials are, in my view, a classic exam_ple of a message conveyed by
words, ambiance and picturization using suggestion, ambiguous comparison and subtle
innuendo .•..
The Commission's opinion ignores or perhaps reverses the standard model of the consumer as ''the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous consumer" which the Commission has been commended to use in determining whether a J>articular act or J>ractice is
unfair or deceptive. (Aronberg v. FTC, 132 F.2d f65, 167 (7th Cir. 1942)) lnsteaa, without
any record evidence to support it the Commission implicitly adof>ts a new consumer
model . . • portraying the consumer as discriminating, sophisticateo and hij;hly knowledgeable as well as skeptical and unbelieving. This consumer knows that fruit drinks are
not the same as citrus Juices despite what Hi-C's ads said.
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posed a trade regulation rule setting forth disclosure standards for
food advertising, that rule would require nutritional information
only to substantiate express nutritional claims. 195 Only with its recent proposals concerning children's television advertising has the
Commission begun to recognize the potentially unfair and misleading effects of food commercials. 196
Even though it has utilized affirmative disclosure as an appropriate remedy for silence that misleads, the Com.mission once stated
with regard to broadcast food advertising that "it would be unrealistic to impose upon the advertiser the heavy burden of nutrition education."197 Unfortunately for the consumer, the food industry is
already conducting a massive campaign of "nutrition education"
designed solely to induce the purchase of its highly processed, rela83 F.T.C. at 802-06 (emphasis original).
ITT Continental Baking Co., Inc., 83 F.T.C. 865, mod!fted, 83 F.T.C. I 105 (1973), enforcement of order as mod!fted granted, 532 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1976), concerned major television,
radio, and print advertising campaigns for Wonder Bread and Hostess snack cakes. The campi:igns were aimed primarily at children aged one through twelve and their mothers. 83 F.T.C.
at 950. The Wonder Bread television advertisements stressed the product's significant contribution to rapid growth and typically contained time-sequence photography depicting a child
rapidly growing taller and larger. The announcer stated that a child would "never need Wonder Bread more than right now, because the time to grow bigger and stronger is during the
Wonder Years-ages one through twelve-the years when your child grows to ninety percent
of his adult height. . . . How can you help? By serving nutritious Wonder Enriched Bread.
Wonder helps build strong bodies twelve ways. Each delicious slice of Wonder Bread supplies
protein ... minerals ... carbohydrates ... vitamins...." 83 F.T.C. at 867. The Hostess
advertisements stated that vitamin-enriched Hostess snack cakes provide "good nutrition" and
implied that the cakes represent a "major nutritional advance." 83 F.T.C. at 872-73.
The FTC staff complaint alleged, inter alia, that the Wonder Bread advertisements were
deceptive because the product is "not an outstanding source of nutrients," will not provide a
child ''with all the nutrients, in recommended quantities, that are essential to healthy growth
and development," and is not "an extraordinary food for producing dramatic growth in children." 83 F.T.C. at 870-72. The Hostess advertisements were said to be deceptive because
vitamin-enrichment was not a major nutritional advance because the snack cakes, made primarily of sugar, provided significant quantities of only three of ten essential vitamins. 83
F.T.C. at 873-74.
The FTC dismissed all allegations but one: it held that the Wonder Bread advertisements
falsely represented the product as having extraordinary growth-inducing qualities. 83 F.T.C. at
962. It found it "impossible to imply from these [Wonder Bread] commercials the very specific
representations" further alleged, 83 F.T.C. at 958, and found corrective advertising unwarranted. 83 F.T.C. at 972. The Hostess advertisements were not deceptive, the FTC concluded,
because vitamin-enriched snack cakes represented a genuine "major nutritional advance" relative to nonenriched snack cakes, because the "good nutrition" claim was implicitly qualified to
mean only vitamin enrichment, and because "housewives are well aware, as a matter of common knowledge and experience, that snack cakes, whether home-made or commercially manufactured, do contain large amounts of sugar." 83 F.T.C. at 964-66. Commissioner Jones
dissented with regard to several of these conclusions. 83 F.T.C. at 943-47.
195. See Proposed Trade Regulation Rule, 39 Fed. Reg. 39,842 (1974). But see the FTC
staff proposal contained in FTC Staff Statement of Fact, Law, and Policy in Support of the
Proposed Rule and in Support of Affirmative Disclosures in Food Advertising, 39 Fed. Reg.
39,852 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Disclosure Statement], discussed in note 200 iefra.
196. See notes 2 & 168 supra.
197. ITT Continental Baking Co., 83 FTC 865, 965, mod!fted, 83 F.T.C. 1105 (1973), enforcement of order as mod!fted granted, 532 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1976).
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tively unnutritious products. 198 The law of deceptive advertising requires that material facts be disclosed where silence misleads. 199
Nothing could be more material to the purchase of food products
than their nutritional qualities. For generations, people have assumed that food feeds-that it has nutritional value sufficient to
meet human needs. Where that assumption no longer holds, advertisers have a responsibility to disclose the facts. 200
Moreover, the significance of television advertising in shaping
viewers' perceptions of food values201 creates a further responsibility
to educate viewers about good nutrition. That so powerful an educational tool should be used to encourage unhealthful eating habits in
a malnourished nation202 is the most offensive and harmful form of
unfairness. 203 As part of the price of access to television, food advertisers should be assessed the cost of corrective nutritional messages,
both informational and motivational.204
198. See text at notes 40-45 supra.
199. See note 174 supra.
200. Former FDA Commissioner Alexander M. Schmidt has pointed out that "[t]he increasing number of processed and formulated foods makes it difficult for consumers to identify the nutritional qualities of the products they purchase." Address ( The Role ofthe FJ)A in
Food Sefety) of Commissioner Schmidt to the American Association for the Advancement of
Science Symposium on Food Safety and the Organic Food Myth (San Francisco, California,
Feb. 25, 1974), quoted in 39 Fed. Reg. 39,854 (1974). See generally J. TURNER, THE CHEMICAL
FEAST (1970). An FDA study found that 40% of shoppers nationwide believed that the government currently insures that processed foods are nutritious and "good for you." PUBLIC
HEALTH SERVICE, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION
AND WELFARE, FDA CONSUMER KNOWLEDGE SURVEY, REPORT I, 1973-74, at 39 (HEW
(FDA) Pub. No. 76-2058, 1976).
The FTC staff has proposed certain affirmative disclosure requirements for all food
advertising, regardless of express claims. See Disclosure Statement, supra note 195. Because
this proposal was not endorsed by the FTC, the Director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection, or the Assistant Director for National Advertising, its prospects for adoption appear remote. The staff set forth four reasons why standards of deceptiveness should apply "with
particular strictness" to food advertising: (I) that advertising's major impact on consumers'
health; (2) its regressive economic impact on the poor; (3) its frequent direction at "especially
vulnerable audiences-children, the poor, the elderly"; and (4) the "special duty of fair dealing
towards consumers" arising from the "power'' and ''tremendous influence" of the food industry's "massive and forceful advertising." Id. at 39,856 (citing Cigarette Statement, supra note
143, at 9357, quoted in text at note 143 supra).
201. See note 44 supra.
202. See note 38 supra.
203. The nation's commitment to the proper nourishment of its people is reflected in numerous congressional enactments. See, e.g., 1 U.S.C. § 2011 (1976) (food stamp program); 42
U.S.C. § 3045 (Supp. V 1975) (nutrition programs for the elderly).
204. The Panel on Popular Education and How To Reach Disadvantaged Groups of the
White House Conference on Food Nutrition and Health stated in its formal recommendations
that
[i]t is impossible for the American people to obtain proper nutrition education without the
planned availability of the mass media of public information-radio and television.
Nutrition education . . . cannot be cast in a beggar's role with radio and television
stations for air time which is the people's property to begin with.
Any nutrition program must have the assurance that it will have at least as much
exposure to the people through their mass media as is received by any selling effort in
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It is perhaps unrealistic to expect the Federal Trade Commission
to respond to the problem of the social impact of television product
advertising more aggressively or innovatively than has the Federal
Communications Commission.205 The purpose of this Note is not to
predict bureaucratic behavior, but to set forth the legal basis for
meaningful action. In light of several recent Supreme Court decisions redefining the scope of constitutional protection accorded commercial speech,206 any proposal for the regulation of television
advertising, whether proscriptive or prescriptive, must be evaluated
against first amendment standards. It is to that concern that this
Note now turns.
IV.

THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND TELEVISION ADVERTISING

The first amendment represents a commitment to free and open
discussion of competing ideas-a commitment based upon the convictions that the freedom to say what one pleases is sacrosanct, that
truth will emerge fortified from the cacophony, and that regulation
of speech invites tyranny. 207 Traditionally, a distinction has been
drawn between "commercial" and "noncommercial" speech for purbehalf of major cigarette brands, automobiles, or airlines or other major consumer product selling efforts.
Final Report, supra note 45, at 182-83. The Panel recommended that radio and television
licensees be required to set aside 10% of broadcast time for "public service communications
programs of the Federal Government." Id. at 183. The Panel evidently envisioned a
mandatory nutrition education program under the "public interest" standard of the Federal
Communications Act of 1934, § 303, 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1970), the cost of which would be borne
by the licensees rather than by food advertisers. In a similar vein, the staff of the U.S. Senate
Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs has generally recommended "extensive use
of television to educate the public in the potential benefits of following certain dietary goals,"
DIETARY GOALS, supra note 40, at 84.
A recent study suggests that the mass media have considerable potential for achieving
changes in health-related behavior. An educational campaign in a California town using tele•
vision and radio spot advertisements, "mini-dramas," and other media resulted in a substantial
reduction in egg consumption and cigarette smoking as compared to a control community,
Maccoby & Farquhar, Communication for Health: Unselling Hearl JJisease, J. COM,, Summer
1975, at 114, 119-20, 122-23.
205. See generally E. Cox, R. FELLMETH & J. SCHULZ, THE NADER REPORT ON THE FED·
ERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1969). Nevertheless, the FTC's discussions suggest the potential for
bold action in the national advertising field, even where substantial economic interests are at
stake. See Cigarette Statement, supra note 143. Moreover, during his confirmation hearings,
Michael Pertschuk expressed concern about the social impacts of advertising, particularly advertising that "revels in waste" of energy and other resources and food advertising that may be
"in part responsible for conditioning a nation of sugar junkies." N.Y. Times, March 31, 1977,
at § D, at 9, col. 2. The FTC's recent initiatives concerning children's television advertising
may signal a new, more activist approach. See notes 2 & 168 supra. See also Brown, TV Edgy
over Refarmers and the F.CC and F.T.C, N.Y. Times, March 22, 1978, § A, at I, col, 5,
206. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Carey v. Population Services
Intl., 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85
(1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748 (1976),
207. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I (1975), and cases cited therein.
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poses of first amendment analysis. 208 Although recent pronouncements of the Supreme Court continue to recognize some distinction,
they preclude the mechanical exclusion of advertising from first
amendment protection merely by a resort to labeling.209 Moreover, a
central premise of this Note has been that product advertising plays
a significant role in shaping cultural and political perceptions, which
suggests that it may be precisely the kind of speech most deserving of
first amendment protection. However, careful analysis of the rationales of the recent decisions extending the constitutional protection to
"commercial speech" indicates that the regulatory approaches proposed by this Note are constitutionally permissible.
In 1942, in a ruling later described by one of the participating
Justices as "casual, almost offhand,"210 the Supreme Court held that
first amendment protections do not extend to "purely commercial
advertising." 211 The Court has forcefully repudiated this absolute
view in a rash of decisions in the past three years. In Bigelow v.
Virginia, 212 the Court struck down a Virginia statute barring advertisement of abortion services, declaring that the "relationship of
speech to the marketplace of products or of services does not make it
valueless in the marketplace of ideas."213 The opinion stressed that
the advertisements at issue "contained factual matter of clear 'public
interest.' " 214 Next, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 215 the Court, although acknowledging that certain commercial advertisements may have special public
interest aspects that leave them open to governmental regulation,
overturned the state's prohibition of price advertising of prescription
drugs on the additional ground that the "free flow of commercial
information" is itself in the public interest and constitutionally protected. 216
208. See Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); Valentine v. Christensen, 316

u:s. 52 (1942).

209. One commentator recently proposed that all ''profit-oriented" speech be deemed beyond the first amendment's purview because such speech does not involve the individual vision or values that lie at the heart of the freedom of expression. Balcer, Commercial Speech: A
.Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 lowA L. REV. I (1976).
210. Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring).
211. Valentine v. Christensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
212. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
213. 421 U.S. at 822. Indeed, the Court noted that the services offered were constitutionally protected. 421 U.S. at 822 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton,
410 U.S. 179 (1973)).
.
214. 421 U.S. at 822.
215. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
216. 425 U.S. at 764-65, 770. The Court stated that
[a]dvertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem, is nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is producing and selling what product, for what
reason, and at what price. So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of our resources in large measure will be made throu~ numerous
private economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those dec1Sions, in the
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In the three most recent commercial speech cases, the Court has
reiterated the public's interest in the free flow of commercial messages. In Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 217 a
unanimous Court held real estate "for sale" signs constitutionally indistinguishable from the advertisements in Bigelow and Virginia
Pharmacy and thus struck down a municipal ordinance banning the
signs' display. The majority opinion in Carey v. Population Services
International, 218 relying upon both the "free flow of commercial information" rationale of Virginia Pharmacy and the special considerations that arise when commercial information relates to
"activity with which, at least in some respects, the State cannot interfere,"219 held unconstitutional a statutory ban on advertisements for
contraceptive products. Finally, a five-member majority in Bates v.
State Bar ofArizona,220 held that blanket suppression of advertising
by attorneys violates the first amendment.
In concluding that commercial speech enjoys constitutional protection, the Court has explicitly recognized that such speech is not
"wholly undifferentiable from other forms" 221 and that the differences "suggest that a different degree of protection is necessary to
insure that the flow of truthful and legitimate commercial information is unimpaired." 222 Although the Court has suggested a few
standards appropriate to commercial speech,223 it has not yet been
required to delineate the precise boundaries of the "degree of protection" to be accorded product advertising. Nonetheless, the principles
expressed by the Court provide at least a tentative basis for evaluataggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free flow of co=ercial information is indispensable. [Citations omitted.] And if it is indispensable to the proper
allocation of resources in a free enterprise system, it is also indispensable to the format10n
of intelligent opinions as to how that system ought to be regulated or altered. Therefore,
even if the First Amendment were thought to l,e primarily an instrument to enlighten
public decisionmaking in a democracy, we could not say that the free flow of information
ooes not serve that goal.
425 U.S. at 765.
217. 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
218. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
219. 425 U.S. at 760. Cf. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (first amendment protection of a message is not necessarily negated because the message has co=ercial aspects),
220. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
221. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24.
222. 425 U.S. at 771 n.24. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 381; Carey, 431 U.S. at 716-17 (Stevens,
J., concurring); Linmark, 431 U.S. at 96.
223. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24. The Court stated that the attribute of commercial speech-that is, that it may be more readily verifiable by the speaker and less likely to
be chilled than nonco=ercial speechmay make it less necessary to tolerate inaccurate statements for fear of silencing the
speaker. . . • They may also make it appropriate to require that a co=ercial message
appear in such a form or include such aooitional information, warnings, and disclaimers,
as are necessary to prevent its being deceptive. . . . They may also malce inapplicable the
prohibition against prior restraints.
425 U.S. at 771 n.24.
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ing the constitutionality of the regulatory approach to television
product advertising suggested by this Note.
Although the issue has not been directly before it, the Court has
stated that the protection accorded commercial speech presents no
obstacle to regulating false, misleading, or deceptive advertising to
ensure "that the stream of commercial information flow[s] cleanly as
well as freely." 224 Such restrictions are consistent with, if not mandated by, the Court's rationale for extending first amendment protection to commercial speech. At the heart of the recent decisions lies
the right of the citizen to receive truthful and reliable information,225
a right protected by regulations prohibiting false, misleading, and
deceptive advertising. 226 In addition, the economic motivation of
commercial speech makes it "durable" enough not to be inhibited by
strict proscription of inaccuracy. 227
Regulation of "unfair," as distinct from "deceptive," appeals has
been so little exercised that courts have yet to consider its constitutional limits. The principles enunciated in the recent commercial
speech decisions suggest that the kinds of advertisements identified
as "unfair" by this Note carry no greater first amendment protection
than do deceptive advertisements. As indicated in section III, unfairness principles give the Commission authority to regulate that portion of a product commercial that conveys implicit messages clearly
harmful in light of fundamental public values. 228
The Supreme Court has extended constitutional protection to
commercial speech in order to protect the public's right to accurate
product information. But advertisements that are arguably unfair are
rarely informative.229 O~ten they are designed to becloud the rational
faculties of the viewer in order to induce purchase not of a product,
but of an image. 230 The implicit association of profligate energy use
224. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 383-84; Car"1, 431
U.S. at 701; 431 U.S. at 716 (Stevens, J., concurring); Linmark, 431 U.S. at 98.
.
225. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 383. q: Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values ofFree Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 432-34 (1971)
(advertising informs consumers of what is offered for sale and provides information which
permits a rational choice among competing products).
226. Differences may exist with respect to what constitutes misleading or deceptive advertising. For example, in Bates, the Supreme Court was divided on whether the particular advertisement in question was deceptive and whether price advertising by attorneys is inherently
deceptive. Compare the majority opinion, 433 U.S. at 372-75, 381-83, with 433 U.S. at 386-88
(Burger, C.J., dissenting), and 433 U.S. at 391-95 (Powell, J., dissenting).
227. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772 n.24. Extrinsic factors material to consumer deci;ions have traditionally been covered by the law of deceptive advertising, see text at note 154
supra, and recent decisions of the Supreme Court give no reason to believe that such misrepre;entations are now protected.
228. See text at notes 153-77 supra.
229. For example, the verbal content of the cigar advertisement described in note 213
rupra consists entirely of a musical jingle and the word "Muriel'' flashed briefly on the screen.
230. See .Developments, supra note 135, at 1010. Historian David Potter pointed out that

542

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 76:498

with high social status, for example, conveys nothing about the quality of the product. In other instances unfair advertising content is not
only irrelevant to the product, but also to the advertising appeal. The
casual but consistent stereotyping of women in advertisements may
often be wholly incidental to the advertiser's purpose. Application of
the unfairness doctrine thus leaves the protected information content
of the commercial speech untouched; by restricting advertising's antirational or irrelevant content, the doctrine serves to highlight information. 231
Properly considered, the regulation of unfairness assesses impact,
not content-it does not restrict dissemination of commercial information, but encourages it. It seeks to prevent the offensive and detrimental impact that may be a consequence of the noninformational
content of television product advertising. The Supreme Court has
stated, however, that the possible offensiveness or detrimental impact of a particular commercial message does not justify its suppression. In Carey the Court refused to uphold a statutory ban on the
advertisement of contraceptive products despite the argument that
such advertisements would be offensive and embarrassing to those
exposed to them. 232 And in Linmark the Court stated that "[a]fter
Virginia Pharmacy it is clear that commercial speech cannot be
banned because of an unsubstantiated belief that its impact is 'detrimental.' " 233 It is important to note, however, that these recent
"advertising tends to minimize information and maximize appeal, with the result that producers tend less to differentiate their products physically, in terms of quality, or economically, in
terms of price, than to differentiate them psychologically in terms of slogan, package, or prestige." Thus, Potter concluded, "advertising tends less to provide the consumer with what he
wants than to make him like what he gets." D. POTIER, supra note 26, at 187-88.
A recent advertisement for Good Housekeeping in Advertising Age nicely illustrates the
manipulative, rather than informative, function of modem advertising. Directed at advertisers
themselves, the advertisement quoted from Emerson: "Build a better mousetrap and the world
will beat a path to your door." The ad copy noted that, in today's skeptical world, a superior
product is insufficient persuasion; a credible advertising medium is essential. "So if you've got
the mousetrap-we've got the cheese." Advertising Age, Oct. 25, 1976, at 27. The advertisement indicated no sense of irony in having transformed Emerson's consumer from a mousetrap pur~haser into a mouse being trapped by the product.
231. Cf. Redish, supra note 225, at 446.
232. The Court stated that "(a]t least where obscenity is not involved, we have consistently
held that the fact that protected speech may be offensive to some does not justify its suppression." 431 U.S. at 701 (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)). Cf. Virginia Pharmacy,
425 U.S. at 765 (1976) (asserting that much advertising is "tasteless and excessive" and probably offends many).
In his concurring opinion in Carey, Justice Stevens emphasized that the Court's opinion
did not "deprive the State of all power to regulate . . . advertising in order to minimize its
offensiveness." 431 U.S. at 717. In addition, see Justice Powell's concurring opinion, 431 U.S.
at 711-12.
233. 431 U.S. at 92 n.6. The Court was not required to decide whether commercial speech
could be banned when the likelihood of detrimental impact had been substantiated because
the Court held that the defendant municipality failed to establish that the proscription of "for
sale" signs would "reduce public awareness of realty sales and thereby decrease public concern
over selling." 431 U.S. at 95-96.
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Supreme Court cases concerned restrictions designed to prevent advertising impact attributable precisely to the protected informational
content of the advertisements. The Township of Willingboro sought
to ban "for sale" signs because it feared the result of public knowledge of the seller's offer to sell. If the contraceptive advertisements in
Carey were offensive and embarrassing to some persons, the nature
of the advertised product was the cause. The advertising messages
that would be regulated by the unfairness doctrine, in contrast, are
entirely incidental to the protected commercial information. 234 Regulation of unfair advertising responds not to the fact of the commercial appeal, but to its manner. With regard to the commercial
information protected by the Constitution, regulation of incidental
messages implicit in the advertisement is no more than a "time,
place, or manner" restriction of the kind expressly reaffirmed in
Linmark.
Judicial recognition of the unique qualities of television broadcasting also suggests that special regulatory measures will survive
constitutional scrutiny. Citing only Capital Broadcasting Co. v.
Mitchell, 235 the Court expressly reserved judgment in Virginia
Pharmacy on the constitutionality of advertising regulation involving "the special problems of the electronic broadcast media." 236 At
first glance that citation is puzzling, because Capital Broadcasting
upheld not merely the regulation of broadcast advertising, but an
outright statutory ban on broadcast advertising of a particular product, cigarettes.237 Since the Court struck down similar suppressions of
particular commercial information in Virginia Pharmacy and its
Although evidence exists of the impact on viewers of unfair appeals, see text at notes
11-47 supra, that evidence may not sufficiently prove adverse impact. Nonetheless, regulation
of unfair appeals would not be constitutionally prohibited because, unlike the situation in
Linmark, the restriction would not be a total ban and, more important, the regulated portion
of the message-the portion having the detrimental impact-would contain no commercial
information. Thus, the adverse impact could be avoided without affecting the protected commercial content of the speech.
234. This is not to say that the messages contained in such appeals can never be protected
by the first amendment. This Note asserts that these appeals are not constitutionally protected
when implicitly made in the context of a product commercial. On the other hand, messages
expressly discussed in this context are afforded complete first amendment protection. Of
course, if the message were expressly conveyed in the broadcast media and concerned an issue
of public controversy, fairness doctrine obligations would arise. See note 249 infra.
235. 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), o/.fd mem. sub nom. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. ·
Acting Atty. Gen., 405 U.S. 1000 (1972), cited in Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 773.
236. 425 U.S. at 773. In addition, see Bates, 433 U.S. at 384 (''the special problems of
advertising on the electronic broadcast media will warrant special consideration"); Carey, 431
U.S. at 712 n.6 (Powell, J., concurring) ("carefully tailored restrictions may be especially appropriate when advertising is accomplished by means of the electronic media"); Bigelow, 42 l
U.S. at 825 n.10 ("[we) need [not) comment on the First Amendment ramifications oflegislative prohibitions of certain kinds of advertising in the electronic media").
237. The statutory ban reviewed in Capital Broadcasting is contained in the Public Health
Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1976).
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other commercial speech decisions, Capital Broadcastings apparent
continuing authority must lie in its distinctive treatment of the
broadcast media. 238 In distinguishing broadcasting from the print
media, Judge Gasch, writing for a majority of the three-judge district
court in Capital Broadcasting, relied principally upon Banzhaf v.
FCC, 239 which had upheld application of the fairness doctrine to cigarette commercials prior to their expulsion from the airwaves. In his
discussion of what he called "the significant differences between the
electronic media and print,240 Judge Gasch quoted an observation of
the Banzhaf Court:
Written messages are not communicated unless they are read, and
reading requires an affirmative act. Broadcasting messages, in contrast,
are "in the air." In an age of omnipresent radio, there scarcely breathes
a citizen who does not know some part of a leading cigarette jingle by
heart. Similarly, an ordinary habitual television watcher can avoid
these commercials only by frequently leaving the room, changing the
channel, or doing some other such affirmative act. It is difficult to calculate the subliminal impact of this pervasive propaganda, which may
be heard even if not listened to, but it may reasonably be thought
greater than that of the written word. 241

This passage recognizes the pervasive impact of the broadcast media-the characteristic that is responsible for the unfairness of television advertising and that makes its regulation necessary. This power
is clearly one of the "special problems" posed by broadcasting in the
context of the first amendment. 2 4 2
Although both Banzhaf and Capital Broadcasting recognized the
impact of television advertising, they concluded that product advertising enjoyed little, if any, constitutional protection.243 Even though
238. The Capital Broadcasting opinion also relied on the theory that the petitioner-broadcasters in the case lost ability to collect revenues but had not lost the right to speak. This theory
is less significant as an explanation of the citation of the case in Virginia Pharma9'because the
pharmacies sustained no economic benefit in the form of fees from not posting drug prices,
239. 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
240. 333 F. Supp. at 586.
241. 333 F. Supp. at 586 (quoting 405 F.2d at 1100-01) (omitting fourth sentence of original quotation).
242. The more traditional rationale for the different first amendment protection accorded
the broadcast media has been the doctrine of "scarcity" and the consequent public "ownership" of the airwaves. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). In his
dissent in Capital Broadcasting, Judge Wright apparently rejected the notion that the power of
broadcasting justifies less stringent first amendment protection. He argued that the greater
government regulation of broadcasting "is constitutionally justified only because it serves to
apportion access to the media fairly." 333 F. Supp. at 590.
243. The Capital Broadcasting and Banzhqf courts considered not only the power of
broadcast advertising, but also its legitimacy as "speech" in the constitutional scheme of freedom of expression. Although Banzhqffound that cigarette advertising implicitly raised controversial issues and thus deserved fairness doctrine reply, it also held that such advertising did
not deserve first amendment protection. Because the advertisements "present[ed] no information or arguments ... which might contribute to public debate," the court held that they were
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this conclusion cannot survive the recent Supreme Court pronouncements, the two decisions are still particularly important for their confirmation of the critical distinction-entirely missed in the FCC's
Fairness Report244-between a message's impact and its value in
reasoned social discourse. Except for the little product information it
provides and the express social statement it virtually never makes,
television product advertising operates outside the realm of rational
discourse.245 Its influence through innuendo and stereotype avoids
the defenses of conscious resistance or rebuttal. 246 Although the
product information and any express social statement contained in it
are protected by the first amendment, the predominating nonrational
content is constitutionally regulable. 247
"at best a negligible 'part of the exposition of ideas, and [were] of . . . slight social value as a
step to truth.'" 405 F.2d at 1102 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572
(1942); the Chaplinsky "exposition of ideas" test of first amendment value in speech was reaffirmed in Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762). The advertisements were therefore "outside the
pale of First Amendment concern." 405 F.2d at 1101.
The Capital Broadcasting court agreed with this reasoning, indicating that fairness doctrine obligations simply reflect "the rather limited extent to which product advertising is tangentially regarded as having some limited indicia of [first amendment] protection." 333 F.
Supp. at 585.
244. See text at notes 74-76, 91-94 supra. q: Ervin, Advertising: Stepchild of the First
Amendment, Advertising Age, April 19, 1976, at 122, col. I; Simmons, supra note 59, at 1109.
245. Gerald J. Thain, then-Assistant Director for Food and Drug Advertising of the FTC's
Bureau of Consumer Protection, has explained that
[t]elevision advertising can combine visual, verbal, and emotional stimuli to provide what
is essentially a nonrational experience for the viewer. A "mood" may be induced, by
color, music, and camera technigues, which is capable of overcoming rational considerations, such as the price of a standardized product. Mood advertising may associate a product with strongly-=held social values sucli as affluence or sophistication, or it may imply
benefits leading toward the satisfaction of basic emotional needs, such as attractiveness to
the opposite sex, freedom from fear, and acceptance. In neither situation is there any
rationa1 connection between the product and the inference being made, and in neither
case does the advertisement provide sufficient information on the product's real attributes,
such as quality and price-information conducive to a rational purchase.
Thain, supra note 167, at 622. See also P. SANDMAN, supra note 15, at 11; Krugman, The
Impact of Television Advertising: Leaming Without Involvement, 29 Pua. OPINION Q. 349, 354
(1965).
246. See note 21 supra.
247. The Virginia Pharmacy Court stated that the standard governing the application of
the first amendment is whether particular speech
is so removed from any "exposition of ideas," Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 572 (1942), and from " 'truth, science, morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of
liberal sentiments on the administration of Government,'" Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476, 484 (1957), that it lacks all protection.
425 U.S. at 762. Applying the standard to commercial speech as a class, the Court held that it
deserved some protection. The application of the standard to the noninformational content of
television product advertising, however, suggests a contrary result. See Banzhef, 405 F.2d at
1102, discussed in note 243 supra, note 245 supra.
The rationale for the regulation of the nonrational content of television commercial advertising is essentially the same rationale that has dictated the regulation of "subliminal" advertising, in which a message is flashed on a screen so briefly that it is consciously unnoticed but
subconsciously communicated. The FCC has emphasized that this practice will not be tolerated. See 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ~ 50,198 (1974). The Commission suggested that such
messages are intended to be "deceptive" and noted that the NAB Television Code prohibits
use of "[a]ny technique whereby an attempt is made to convey info~ation to the viewer by
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It is ti:ue that a great deal of protected communication contains
nonrational elements.248 The crowd-pleasing speech, the spot advertisement for a political candidate, and the ordinary motion picture
all appeal to the intuitive, emotional, and subconscious faculties of
their audiences. But, in each of these examples, the nonrational
messages conveyed are primary and direct: the speaker usually intends to convey them and the listener is usually aware of their presence, which allows him to guard against them. Indeed, except in the
case of the political advertisement, the listener has actively solicited
the communication for the specific purpose of enjoying its influences, rational or otherwise. In contrast, the unfair messages of television product advertising are, fo.r both speaker and listener, purely
ancillary to the primary message of promoting the sale of the product.249 The advertiser does not expressly state the unfair messages
and may not even be aware of them; the audience did not solicit
them and has no defense against them. 250 They are not commercial
speech-they are not speech.
An advertiser may expressly discuss an issue of public controversy in the course of a commercial message, and there would then
be little doubt of its protected status. 251 The advertiser could argue
that snowmobiling is safer and more energy efficient than other recreation, that women find their deepest fulfillment in housework, or
that sugar is an invaluable nutrient. But the viewer could then consciously weigh the merits of these explicit arguments with a critical
eye. The viewer, indeed, would also have the benefit of opposing
views presented under the fairness doctrine, even as presently adtransmitting messages below the threshold of normal awareness." Id at 55,370. Subliminal
advertising raises no first amendment issue not because the subliminal message is not influential, but because it operates extra-rationally-that is, the inability of the recipient to perceive
consciously a subliminal message renders it dangerous. See Note, Freedom ofExpression in a
Commercial Context, 78 HARV. L. REv. 1191, 1202 (1965). The unfair appeals and social models of television product advertising, as the Banzhof and Capital Broadcasting courts understood, are no more deserving of constitutional protection.
248. See Note, supra note 247, at 1202.
249. In some instances, of course, the advertiser may be well aware of the nonrational
appeal of the commercial and feel that it is essential for successful marketing. For example, in
order to maintain a market for dishwasher detergent that leaves glassware "spotless," an advertiser may feel compelled to use the product commercial to reinforce the view that women
find deep fulfillment in housework, the mastery of which includes avoiding water-spotted
glassware. Although messages ancillary to the informational content of noncommercial speech
are tolerated for fear of otherwise chilling speech that contributes to public debate, tighter
regulation can operate in the context of commercial speech with little likelihood of stifling the
protected commercial message. See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24. Moreover, the
noncommercial message of advertising forfeits constitutional protection only when the advertiser chooses to keep it implicit.
250. See note 19 supra.
251. Cf. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 764-65 ("Obviously, not all commercial messages
contain the same or even a very great public interest element. There are few to which such an
element could not be added").
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m.inistered. 252
The conclusion that the deceptive and unfair appeals of television product advertising are constitutionally regulable does not ensure that the particular regulatory remedy253 selected will be
constitutionally permissible. The remedies suggested in this Note,
however, do not appear to exceed constitutional bounds. The FTC's
remedy of disclosure for deceptive advertising is consistent with the
extension of constitutional protection to commercial speech. Although the constitutionality of a remedy requiring disclosure was not
passed upon by the Court, language in both Virginia Pharmacy and
Linmark suggests that different constitutional considerations apply
to that remedy than to an absolute ban on advertising. 254 Disclosure
requirements, of course, vindicate the public's right to commercial
information by curing deception through the remedy of additional
information. Although the burden of disclosure might ordinarily
raise a first amendment question, 255 the burden is not imposed ab. sent material deception, the regulation of which is expressly approved in the Court's recent opinions.256
This Note has suggested that, rather than proscribing unfair advertising appeals, the better remedy for unfair advertising is usually
corrective advertising designed to vitiate the unfairness through rebuttal and counter-persuasion.257 Corrective advertising is also a
more appropriate remedy than mere disclosure in some instances of
deceptive or misleading advertising. 258 The constitutional issues
presented by corrective advertising in the context of deceptiveness
are similar to those raised by the disclosure remedy: each requires
the ·airing of statements regarding commercial information about the
advertised product. Moreover, the remedy of corrective advertising
in deceptive television product advertising has been upheld against
constitutional challenge in a recent decision of the Court of Appeals
252. See text at note 71 supra. The advertiser might still be held accountable to the FTC
for the truth of factually verifiable claims for the product. See, e.g., National Commn. on Egg
Nutrition, 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ~ 21,184 (1976), order e'!forced in part, 510 F.2d 157 (7th
Cir. 1977).
253. The application of the FCC's fairness doctrine to product advertising presents no constitutional problems that have not already been resolved with respect to other forms of protected speech. See text at notes 78-79 supra.
254. In Virginia Pharmacy, the Court indicated that the distinctive attributes of co=ercial speech "may . . . make it appropriate to require that a co=eicial message appear in
such a form, or include such additional iefonnation, warnings, and disclaimers, as are necessary to prevent its being deceptive." 425 U.S. at 771 n.24 (emphasis added). This language was
noted in Linmark, 43 l U.S. at 90, where the Court stated that such requirements raise very
different constitutional considerations than would total bans on particular types of advertisements.
255. See text at notes 262-65 infra.
256. See text at notes 224-26 supra.
251. See text at notes 192 & 204 supra.
258. See text at notes 182-84 supra.
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for the District of Columbia Circuit, Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC. 259
Citing Virginia Pharmacy for the proposition that "the First Amendment presents 'no obstacle' to government regulation of false or misleading advertising," 260 the court in Warner-Lambert rejected the
contention that first amendment protection of commercial speech
precludes the remedy of corrective advertising in deceptive advertising cases. 261
The use of corrective advertising to counter unfairness raises
more difficult constitutional questions, for in this context the corrective advertisements, rather than merely correcting earlier impressions conveyed about the characteristics of a particular product,
would present a counterview on a social issue implicitly raised in the
advertiser's commercials. The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit recently addressed concerns similar to those raised
by requiring corrective advertising that goes beyond a statement of
product characteristics to a declaration of opinion. In United States
v. National Society of Professional Engineers, 262 the court reversed
that portion of the district court's order that required the defendant
to state to its members that it "does not consider competitive bidding
to be unethical. 263 In modifying the decree, the court reasoned that
the first amendment requires that an affirmative speech remedy "not
be more intrusive than necessary to achieve fulfillment of the governmental interest." 264 The court's primary concern was that the
lower court's decree forced "an association of individuals to express
as its own opinion judicially dictated ideas."265 A corrective remedy
to unfair advertising, in contrast, need only present countervailing
ideas which would not be represented as the views of the offending
advertiser. With careful attention to the exigencies of particular
cases, the FTC could readily fashion unfairness remedies "no more
intrusive than necessary"-that is, broad enough to avoid dictating
precise content yet strict enough to achieve the desired results. 266
259. 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1575 (1978),
260. 562 F.2d at 758.
261. The Supreme Court has suggested in another context that affirmative and general
speech requirements may be constitutionally preferred to abridgements. See Buckley v, Valeo,
424 U.S. I, 49 n.55 (1976).
262. 555 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 434 U.S. 815 (1977),
263. 555 F.2d at 984.
264. 555 F.2d at 984. See Warner-Lambert Co., 562 F.2d at 758: "Petitioner is correct that
this triggers a special responsibility on the Commission to order corrective advertising only if
the restriction inherent in its order is no greater than necessary to serve the interest involved."
Cf. Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 61 I, 618-20 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983
(1977) (prior restraints on specific content of co=ercial speech must be carefully examined).
265. 555 F.2d at 984. The court's deference to the Society as "an association of individuals" may hint that, even where some affirmative remedy is warranted, the courts may be more
reluctant to prescribe speech by persons or groups than by corporations.
266. Banzhaf cautioned against strict prescriptions of speech, even where an affirmative
remedy is appropriate. 405 F.2d at 1103. The court stated:
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Critics of governmental regulation of broadcasting fear most the
specter of governmental "propaganda" dominating the airwaves. 267
None of the proposals discussed in this Note begin to approach pervasive governmental control of broadcasting. Americans have a justified fear of anyone deciding for them what they "ought" to see and
hear. 268 Television broadcasting, as presently structured, forces an
uncomfortable policy choice between delegating this decision wholly
to corporate advertisers and permitting representative government to
intervene on behalf of a perceived public interest. Whether called
"education," "acculturation," or "advertising," propaganda is constantly broadcast to television viewers. 269 The question is whether it
is to be accountable to the public.
The Supreme Court has properly renounced the absolute exclusion of commercial speech from constitutional protection. It has
carefully refrained, however, from extending such protection to commercial advertising in all forms and under all circumstances. Where
television product advertising communicates only by image and innuendo, it cannot claim the protection of the first amendment.
V.

CONCLUSION

The constant challenge of an evolving technological society is to
prevent rapid innovation from outstripping the understanding and
control of the people and their representatives. As one commentator
has noted, ''we will either direct our technology or it will be used to
direct us. In communications the second course has been evident for .
some time." 270 In a pluralistic, democratic society, the issues presented by pervasive television advertising conveying latent cultural
messages are troubling. Although the problems suggest a need for
innovative governmental response, that response has not been forthFinally, not only does the cigarette ruling not repress any information, it serves affirmatively to provide information. We do not doubt that official prescription in detail or in
quantity of what the press must say can be as offensive to the principle of a free press as
official prohibition. But the cigarette ruling does not dictate specific content and, in view
of its• special context, it is not a precedent for converting broadcasting into a mouthpiece
for government propaganda.
267. See405 F.2d at 1103.
268. See Jones, supra note 50, at 392.
269. Communications scholars have long recognized the correspondence between state
propaganda and private-sector advertising. See, e.g., Bauer, The Obstinate Audience: The I'!fluence Processfrom the Point of View ofSocial Communication, 19 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 319, 319
(1964); Lazarsfeld & Morton, surpa note 20, at 339. Klapper has stated:
Propaganda, in short, appears wherever there are two unidentical minds and a means of
communication. These are the simple necessary and sufficient conditions for an attempt to
engineer consent. The current fear of propaganda is perhaps not ill-founded, but it is
inexactly expressed. For what the guardians of the free mind really fear is not the engineerini of consent, but rather that the engineering will be so successful as to bar the
conditions for opposing engineering. The goal perilous is not consent, but unanimity.
Klapper, 17 AM. SCHOLAR 419, supra note 17, at 420.
270. H. SCHILLER, supra note 17, at 150.
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coming. Apparently out of concern for the economic base of broadcasting, the Federal Communications Commission has effectively
excised product advertising from its mandate to regulate communications in the "public interest." The Federal Trade Commission,
meanwhile, has been largely unwilling to confront the unfairness
and deception of subtly implied claims and psychological appeals.
Yet the first amendment, far from prohibiting innovative reform,
stands for the fundamental value that reform would serve-the integrity of public discourse.

